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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the optimal securitisation model of Pagès [50] and Possamaï and Pagès [51] between an
investor and a bank to a setting allowing both moral hazard and adverse selection. Following the recent approach
to these problems of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [14], we characterise explicitly and rigorously the so-called credible
set of the continuation and temptation values of the bank, and obtain the value function of the investor as well as
the optimal contracts through a recursive system of first-order variational inequalities with gradient constraints. We
provide a detailed discussion of the properties of the optimal menu of contracts.
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1 Introduction
Principal–Agent problems with moral hazard have an extremely rich history, dating back to the early static models of
the 70s, see among many others Zeckhauser [68], Spence and Zeckhauser [63], or Mirrlees [42, 43, 44, 45], as well as the
seminal papers by Grossman and Hart [26], Jewitt, [33], Holmström [30] or Rogerson [57]. If moral hazard results from
the inability of the Principal to monitor, or to contract upon, the actions of the Agent, there is a second fundamental
feature of the Principal-Agent relationship which has been very frequently studied in the literature, namely that of
adverse selection, corresponding to the inability to observe private information of the Agent, which is often referred
to as his type. In this case, the Principal offers to the Agent a menu of contracts, each having been designed for a
specific type. The so-called revelation principle, states then that it is always optimal for the Principal to propose menus
for which it is optimal for the Agent to truthfully reveal his type. Pioneering research in the latter direction were
due to Mirrlees [46], Mussa and Rosen [47], Roberts [55], Spence [62], Baron and Myerson [7], Maskin and Riley [38],
Guesnerie and Laffont [27], and later by Salanié [59], Wilson [67], or Rochet and Choné [56]. However, despite the
early realisation of the importance of considering models involving both these features at the same time, the literature
on Principal-Agent problems involving both moral hazard and adverse selection has remained, in comparison, rather
scarce. As far as we know, they were considered for the first time by Antle [2], in the context of auditor contracts, and
then, under the name of generalised Principal-Agent problems, by Myerson [48]1. These generalised agency problems
were then studied in a wide variety of economic settings, notably by Dionne and Lasserre [17], Laffont and Tirole [35],
McAfee and McMillan [39], Picard [54], Baron and Besanko [4, 5], Melumad and Reichelstein [40, 41], Guesnerie, Picard
and Rey [28], Page [49], Zou [69], Caillaud, Guesnerie and Rey [10], Lewis and Sappington [36], or Bhattacharyya [8]2.
All the previously mentioned models are either in static or discrete–time settings. The first study of the continuous time
problem with moral hazard and adverse selection was made by Sung [64], in which the author extends the seminal finite
horizon and continuous–time model of Holmström and Milgrom [31]. A more recent work, to which our paper is mostly
related has been treated by Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [14], where the authors extend the famous infinite horizon model
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1There were earlier attempts in this direction, but providing a less systematic treatment of the problem; see the income tax model of
Mirrlees [46], the Soviet incentive scheme study of Weitzman [66], or the papers by Baron and Holmström [6] and Baron [3].
2We refer the interested reader to the more recent works of Faynzilberg and Kumar [22], Theilen [65], Jullien, Salanié and Salanié [34],
Gottlieb and Moreira [25].
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
05
86
4v
3 
 [q
-fi
n.E
C]
  1
6 J
an
 20
19
of Sannikov [60] to the adverse selection setting. If one of the main contributions of Sannikov [60] was to have identified
that the continuation value of the Agent was a fundamental state variable for the problem of the Principal, [14] shows
that in a context with both moral hazard and adverse selection, the Principal has also to keep track of the so-called
temptation value, that is to say the continuation utility of the Agent who would not reveal his true type. Although
close to the latter paper, our work is foremost an extension of the bank incentives model of Pagès and Possamaï [51],
which studies the contracting problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank who monitors a pool of
long term loans subject to Markovian contagion (we also refer the reader to the companion paper by Pagès [50] for the
economic intuitions and interpretations of the model).
The home loan crash of 2008 has strongly highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the securitisation agreements created
during the 2000s, and was at the heart of the decision from the US government to impose tight deadlines for the
adoption of new and tighter regulations for credit risk retention. Among these, one of particular interest for us is the
Dodd–Frank Act, which prescribes that sponsors retain at least five percent of the credit risk in most securitisation
transactions. The purpose of [50, 51] was to study optimal securitisation when the sponsor remains involved with its
retail originations, and can engage in unobservable actions that result in private benefits at the expense of performance.
The assumption that the bank itself can have impact on the default rate of the pool over time is a metaphor for the
distinction between its exogenous base quality and the endogenous default probability obtained after monitoring. Moral
hazard then emerges because the bank has more "skin in the game" than the investors, and has the opportunity, ex
ante and ex post, to exercise a (costly) monitoring of the non–defaulted loans. This is a stylised way to sum up all
the actions that the bank can enter into to ensure itself of the solvability of the borrowers. There is much that the
bank can do to improve performance over the life of a transaction. First, a strong quality control process helps lenders
exercise due diligence in evaluating borrowers’ current income, and keep track of those who might be getting closer to
default. This is a surveillance action which has to be undertaken continuously, and not only prior to the inception of
the contract. Second, the bank can efficiently assist troubled borrowers by acting early and firmly, before mortgages
become seriously delinquent. The selection of bank employees in charge of these actions is also usually assumed to
potentially affect loss severity by as much as 30%. For instance, Agarwal et al. [1] have put into light important and
systematic changes in the default rates of state–chartered banks’ real estate loans, when a so–called "rotation" policy
between federal and state supervisors at predetermined time periods is put into place. This clearly shows that banks
are perfectly able to enter into corrective actions in the event of delinquencies, when they have incentives to do so.
The findings of [50, 51] were that since the investors cannot observe the monitoring effort of the bank, they proposed
CDS type contracts offering remuneration to the bank, and giving it incentives through postponement of payments and
threat of stochastic liquidation of the contract (similarly to the seminal paper of Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve
[9]). In the present paper, we assume furthermore that there are two types of banks, which we call good and bad,
co–existing in the market, differing by their efficiency in using their remuneration (or equivalently differing by their
monitoring costs). Even if the investor is supposed to know the distribution of the type of banks, that is to say the
probability with which the bank he is currently discussing with is good or bad, he cannot know for sure what her type
is. Again, this is a stylised way to express the fact that "skin in the game" might significantly vary from one bank
to the other. The fact that we consider only two types is mainly for simplicity and tractability, and because fully
multidimensional screening problems are already extremely hard to solve in static one–period models, and except for
specific models (see Section 2.1 for details), nothing more than existence of an optimal contract can be hoped for, see
for instance Carlier [11].
Mathematically speaking, we follow the general dynamic programming approach of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi
[13], as well as that on adverse selection problems initiated by [14]. Intuitively, these approaches require first, using
martingale (or more precisely backward SDEs) arguments, to solve the (non-Markovian) optimal control problem faced
by the two types of banks when choosing contracts. This requires obviously, using the terminology introduced above,
to keep track of both the continuation value and the temptation value of the banks, when they choose the contract
designed for them or not. The problem of the Principal rewrites then as two standard stochastic control problems,
one in which he hires the good bank, and one in which he hires the bad one. Each of these problems uses in turn the
aforementioned two state variables (and these two only, because the horizon is infinite and the Principal is risk-neutral),
with truth-telling constraint, asserting that the continuation value should always be greater than the temptation value.
This leads to optimal control problems with state constraints, and thus to Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short)
equations (or more precisely variational inequalities with gradient constraints, since our problem is actually a singular
stochastic control problem) in a domain, which, following [14], we call the credible set. This set is defined as the set
containing the pair of value functions of the good and bad bank under every admissible contract offered by the investor.
The determination of this set is the first fundamental step in our approach. Following the the orignal ideas of [14], we
prove that the determination of the boundaries of this set can be achieved by solving two so-called double-sided moral
hazard problems, in which one of the type of banks is actually hiring the other one. Fortunately for us, it turned out
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to be possible to obtain rigorously3 explicit expressions for these boundaries by solving the associated system of HJB
equations and using verification type arguments. We also would like to emphasise that unlike in [14], there is certain
dynamic component in our model, since we have to keep track of the number of non-defaulted loans, through a time
inhomogeneous Poisson process. This leads to a dynamic credible set, as well as, in the end, to a recursive system of
HJB equations characterising the value function of the Principal.
After having determined the credible set itself, we pursue our study by concentrating on two specific forms of contracts:
the shutdown contract in which the investor designs a contract which will be accepted only by the good bank, and
the more classical screening contract, corresponding to a menu of contracts, one for each type of bank, which provides
incentives to reveal her true type and choose the contract designed for her. These two contracts correspond simply to
the offering, over the correct domain of expected utilities of the banks (so as to satisfy the proper truth–telling and
participation constraints), of the best contracts that the investor can design independently for hiring the good and the
bad bank.
Since we characterise, under classical verification type arguments, the value function of the investor through a system of
HJB equations, we also have classically access to the optimal contracts through this value function and its derivatives.
This allows us to provide an associated qualitative and quantitative analysis. It turns out that the optimal contracts
designed for the good and the bad bank share the same attributes, and are close in spirit to the ones derived in the
pure moral hazard case in [51]. On the boundaries of the credible set, the value function of the bad bank plays the role
of a state process. The payments of the optimal contracts are postponed until the moment the state process reaches a
sufficiently high level, depending on the current size of the project. Similarly, when one of the loans in the pool defaults,
the project is liquidated with a probability that decreases with the value of the state process. If the value function of
the bad bank at the default time is below some critical level, the project will be liquidated for sure under the optimal
contracts. On the other side, if the value function of the bad bank is high enough at the default time, the project will
be maintained. In the interior of the credible set, the continuation value and the temptation value of the banks are the
state processes for the optimal contracts. It is possible to identify zones of good performance inside of the credible set,
where the agents are remunerated and the project is maintained in case a default occurs. It is also possible to identify
zones of bad performance, where the agents are not paid and the project is liquidated in case of default. In the rest of
the credible set the optimal contracts provide intermediary situations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, we define the set of admissible contracts
and we state the investor’s problem. In Section 3, we recall the results obtained in [51] for the case of pure moral hazard,
which will be useful later on for us. In Section 4, we formally study the credible set and obtain an explicit expression
for it. In Section 5, we study both the optimal shutdown and screening contract, describing their characteristics and
the behaviour of the banks when they accept these contracts. The Appendix contains all the technical proofs of the
paper.
Notations: Let N denote the set of non–negative integers. For any n ∈ N\{0}, we identify Rn with the set of
n−dimensional column vectors. The associated inner product between two elements (x, y) ∈ Rn × Rn will be denoted
by x ·y. For simplicity of notations, we will sometimes write column vectors in a row form, with the usual transposition
operator >, that is to say (x1, . . . , xn)> ∈ Rn for some xi ∈ R, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let R+ denote the set of non–negative
real numbers, and B(R+) the associated Borel σ−algebra. For any fixed non–negative measure ν on (R+,B(R+)), the
Lebesgue–Stieljes integral of a measurable map f : R+ −→ R will be denoted indifferently∫
[u,t]
f(s)dνs or
∫ t
u
f(s)dνs, 0 ≤ u ≤ t.
2 The model
This section is dedicated to the description of the model we are going to study, presenting the contracts as well as
the criterion of both the Principal and the Agent. As recalled in the Introduction, it is actually an adverse selection
extension of the model introduced first by Pagès in [50] and studied in depth by Pagès and Possamaï [51].
3Notice that in this respect the study in [14] was more formal, and our paper provides, as far as we know, the first rigorous derivation of
this credible set.
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2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a model in continuous time, indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). Without loss of generality and for simplicity, the
risk–free interest rate is taken to be 0.4 Our first player will be a bank (the Agent, referred to as "she"), who has
access to a pool of I unit loans indexed by j = 1, . . . , I which are ex ante identical. Each loan is a perpetuity yielding
cash flow µ per unit time until it defaults. Once a loan defaults, it gives no further payments. As is commonplace in
the Principal–Agent literature, especially since the paper of Sannikov [60], the infinite maturity assumption is here for
simplicity and tractability, since it makes the problem stationary, in the sense that the value function of the Principal
will not be time–dependent. We assume that the banks in the market are different, and that two types of banks coexist,
each one being characterised by a parameter taking values in the set R := {ρg, ρb} with ρg > ρb. We call the bank
good (respectively bad) if its type is ρg (respectively ρb). Furthermore, it is considered to be common knowledge that
the proportion of the banks of type ρi, i ∈ {g, b}, is pi ∈ (0, 1).
Denote by
Nt :=
I∑
j=1
1{τj≤t},
the sum of individual loan default indicators, where τ j is the default time of loan j. The current size of the pool is,
at some time t ≥ 0, I − Nt. Since all loans are a priori identical, they can be reindexed in any order after defaults.
The action of the banks consists in deciding at each time t ≥ 0 whether they monitor any of the loans which have not
defaulted yet. These actions are summarised by the functions ej,it , where for 1 ≤ j ≤ I −Nt, i ∈ {g, b}, ej,it = 1 if loan
j is monitored at time t by the bank of type ρi, and e
j,i
t = 0 otherwise. Non-monitoring renders a private benefit B > 0
per loan and per unit time to the bank, regardless of its type. The opportunity cost of monitoring is thus proportional
to the number of monitored loans. Once more, more general cost structures could be considered, but this choice has
been made for the sake of simplicity.
The rate at which loan j defaults is controlled by the hazard rate αjt specifying its instantaneous probability of default
conditional on history up to time t. Individual hazard rates are assumed to depend on the monitoring choice of the
bank and on the size of the pool. In particular, this allows to incorporate a type of contagion effect in the model.
Specifically, we choose to model the hazard rate of a non–defaulted loan j at time t, when it is monitored (or not) by
a bank of type ρi as
αj,it := αI−Nt
(
1 +
(
1− ej,it
)
ε
)
, t ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , I −Nt, i ∈ {b, g}, (2.1)
where the parameters {αj}1≤j≤I are positive constants representing individual “baseline” risk under monitoring when
the number of loans is j, and ε > 0 is the proportional impact of shirking on default risk. We assume that the impact
of shirking is independent of the type of the bank. There are two main reasons for this choice. First of all, it is well–
known that as soon as the dimension of the type is greater or equal to 2, we enter into the field of multidimensional
screening, which, already for static one period models is notoriously hard to analyse, and deriving meaningful economic
interpretations is most often elusive (see the seminal paper of Rochet and Choné [56] or the more recent contribution
of Figalli et al. [23] for more details). Notwithstanding this difficulty, we also found out that differentiating between
the banks in this regard created degeneracy in the model. We refer the reader to Section F.2 in the Appendix for a
more detailed explanation.
For i ∈ {b, g}, we define the shirking process ki as the number of loans that the bank of type ρi fails to monitor at time
t ≥ 0. Then, according to (2.1), the corresponding aggregate default intensity is given by
λk
i
t :=
I−Nt∑
j=1
αj,it = αI−Nt
(
I −Nt + εkit
)
. (2.2)
The banks can fund the pool internally at a cost r ≥ 0. They can also raise funds from a competitive investor (the
Principal, referred to as "he") who values income streams at the prevailing risk–less interest rate of zero. We assume
that both the banks and the investor observe the history of defaults and liquidations, as well as the parameters pb and
pg, but the monitoring choices and the type of the bank are unobservable for the investor.
2.2 Description of the contracts
Before going on, let us now describe the stochastic basis on which we will be working. We will always place ourselves
on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which N is a point process with intensity λ0t , which is defined by (2.2) when all
4As already pointed out in the seminal paper of Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve [9], see also [51], the only quantity of interest
here is the difference between the discounting factors of the Principal and the Agent.
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loans are monitored at all times, that is
λ0t = αI−Nt
(
I −Nt
)
.
We denote by F := (FNt )t≥0 the P−completion of the natural filtration of N . We call τ the liquidation time of the
whole pool and let Ht := 1{t≥τ} be the liquidation indicator of the pool. We denote by G := (Gt)t≥0 the minimal
filtration containing F and that makes τ a G−stopping time. We note that this filtration satisfies the usual hypotheses
of completeness and right–continuity.
Contracts are offered by the investor to the bank and agreed upon at time 0. As usual in contracting theory, the
bank can accept or refuse the contract, but once accepted, both the bank and the investor are fully committed to the
contract. More precisely, the investor offers a menu of contracts Ψi := (ki, θi, Di), i ∈ {g, b} specifying on the one hand
a desired level of monitoring ki for the bank of type ρi, which is a G−predictable process such that for any t ≥ 0, kit
takes values in {0, . . . , I−Nt} (this set is denoted by K), as well as a flow of payment Di. These payments belong to set
D of processes which are càdlàg, non–decreasing, non–negative, G−predictable and such that there exists some β > 0
EP
[
eβτ
(∫ τ
0
e−rsdDis
)2]
< +∞. (2.3)
We do not rule out the possibility of immediate lump–sum payments at the initialisation of the contract, and therefore
the processes in D are assumed to satisfy D0− = 0. Hence, if D0 6= 0, it means that a lump–sum payment has indeed
been made. Notice also that since the intensities of N and H under P are bounded, we know that τ has at least some
exponential moments under P, meaning that any bounded payment belongs to D.
The contract also specifies when liquidation occurs. We assume that liquidations can only take the form of the stochastic
liquidation of all loans following immediately default. Hence, the contract specifies the probability θit, which belongs
to the set Θ of [0, 1]−valued, G−predictable processes, with which the pool is maintained given default (dNt = 1), so
that at each point in time, if the bank has indeed chosen the contract Ψi
dHt =
{
0 with probability θit,
dNt with probability 1− θit.
With our notations, given a contract Ψi, the hazard rates associated with the default and liquidation processes Nt and
Ht are, if the bank does choose the contract Ψi, λk
i
t and
(
1− θit
)
λk
i
t , respectively. The above properties translate into
P
[
τ ∈ {τ1, ..., τ I} ] = 1, and P[τ = τ j |Fτj , τ > τ j−1] = 1− θiτj , j ∈ {1, . . . , I} .
For ease of notations, a contract Ψ := (k, θ,D) will be said to be admissible if (k, θ,D) ∈ K×Θ×D. As is commonplace
in the Principal–Agent literature, we assume that the monitoring choices of the banks affect only the distribution of the
size of the pool. To formalise this, recall that, by definition, any shirking process k ∈ K is G−predictable and bounded.
Then, by Girsanov’s theorem, we can define a probability measure Pk on (Ω,F), equivalent to P, such that Nt−
∫ t
0
λkt ds
is a Pk−martingale. More precisely, we have on Gt
dPk
dP
= Zkt ,
where Zk is the unique solution of the following SDE
Zkt = 1 +
∫ t
0
Zks−
(
λks
λ0s
− 1
)(
dNs − λ0sds
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, P− a.s.
Then, if the bank of type ρi chooses the contract Ψi, her utility at t = 0, if she follows the recommendation ki, is given
by
ui0(k
i, θi, Di) := EP
ki
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rs
(
ρidD
i
s +Bk
i
sds
)]
, (2.4)
while that of the investor is
v0
(
(Ψi)i∈{g,b}
)
:=
∑
i∈{g,b}
piEP
ki
[ ∫ τ
0
(
I −Ns
)
µds− dDis
]
. (2.5)
The parameter ρi actually discriminates between the two types of banks through the way they derive utility from the
cash–flows delivered by the investor. Hence, for a same level of salary, the good bank will get more utility than a bad
bank. Such a form of adverse selection is also considered in the paper of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [14]. Notice that de
dependence of the value functions of both the bank and the investor depend on the contract through the process Di,
but also through the stopping time τ , whose distribution depends both on θi and the effort choice ki of the bank.
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2.3 Formulation of the investor’s problem
We assume that the bank of type ρi has an outside opportunity to the contract which provides her reservation utility
Ri0. The investor’s problem is to offer a menu of admissible contracts (Ψi)i∈{g,b} := (ki, θi, Di)i∈{g,b} which maximises
his utility (2.5), subject to the three following constraints
ui0(k
i, θi, Di) ≥ Ri0, i ∈ {g, b}, (2.6)
ui0(k
i, θi, Di) = sup
k∈K
ui0(k, θ
i, Di), i ∈ {g, b}, (2.7)
ui0(k
i, θi, Di) ≥ sup
k∈K
ui0(k, θ
j , Dj), i 6= j, (i, j) ∈ {g, b}2. (2.8)
Condition (2.6) is the usual participation constraint for the banks. Condition (2.7) is the so–called incentive compati-
bility condition, stating that given (θi, Di), the recommended effort ki is an optimal monitoring choice for the bank of
type ρi . Finally, Condition (2.8) means that if a bank adversely selects a contract, she cannot get more utility than if
she had truthfully revealed her type at time 0. Following the literature, we call such a contract a screening contract.
In the sequel, we will start by deriving the optimal contract in the pure moral hazard case, then we will look into the so–
called optimal shutdown contract, for which the investor deliberately excludes the bad bank, before finally investigating
the optimal screening contract. We will invoke some results from [50] in this paper, for this reason we will require later
the assumptions of their main result, Theorem 3.15, which are the following.
Assumption 2.1. Let αI be the harmonic mean of the (αj)1≤j≤I ,
(i) µ ≥ αI .
(ii) We have for all j ≤ I, rB(1 + ε) ≤ (µε−B)εαj .
(iii) Individual default risk is non–decreasing with past default, αj ≤ αj−1, for all j ≤ I.
2.4 Comments on the modelling choices and assumptions
Let us start by discussing Assumption 2.1. Concerning (i), under monitoring, the expected duration until the next
default in a pool of j loans is 1/λj . Hence, the average revenue from the pool over that period will be given by µ/λj ,
of which 1/I is ascribed to the original loan. The payoff of a loan corresponds then to summing this quantity over j,
and the obtained result must be above the initial unit cost for the loan to be worth anything at all under monitoring.
Assumption 2.1(ii) imposes an upper bound on the bank’s discount rate, and basically states that it should not be so
large that the cost of the rent extracted by a monitoring bank outweighs the pecuniary gains stemming from the use of
the monitoring technology. Finally Assumption 2.1(iii) simply models a contagion effect, translating the fact that past
defaults impact positively the likelihood of a further default to happen.
A second important point in the model is the liquidation policy of the contract. Even though liquidations are inefficient
in the first–best situation without moral hazard nor adverse selection (see [50]), they are necessary in the second–best
in order to restore incentives to monitor when performance is poor. However, liquidation can take many forms, and
for instance liquidating all loans with state–dependent probability is not necessarily better than partially liquidating
the pool with fixed probability. Another option would be to downsize the pool by a potentially larger number of loans,
possibly state–dependent as well, whenever a default occurs. Given that in practice liquidations are rarely decided in
such a random fashion, it is of the utmost importance to verify that such liquidation policies cannot improve on social
welfare. In the case of pure moral hazard, [50, Proposition 6] has shown that stochastic liquidation was optimal among
all policies under an assumption which is met if changes in default intensities for the loans are gradual. Since the
capital structure of subprime mortgage–backed securities is typically split up into a large number of tranches, where it
is then reasonable to assume that default intensities are constant, such an assumption will be verified in the real–world
applications of the model.
Another very important assumption here is the fact that we consider a "full commitment" dynamic contracting problem
between the investor and the bank. In other words, both parties are fully committed to the long–term dynamic contract
at the onset of the relationship. However, one of the central features of banks, namely the fragility of their capital
structures, stems from the fact that there is usually a limited commitment in the relationship between clients and banks,
since, as highlighted by the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig [16], bank cleints can withdraw funds from banks
at any time. We are perfectly conscient of this fact and have chosen to postpone the discussion of how to integrate
non–commitment in our model to Section 6.2 below, since the mathematics behind are similar.
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In our model, adverse selection stems only from the monitoring costs of the two types of banks. A possible extension
of our model could rely on a further differentiation between the work of the banks, i.e. when both good bank and bad
bank work, the good one would be more efficient in the sense that the associated default intensity is strictly smaller
than that of the bad bank. This would also be a possible way to model the fact that the pool of loans of each bank
could have different qualities. However, as will be explained in Appendix F.2, such a feature would actually make the
problem degenerate, in the sense that the upper boundary of the credible set that will be defined in Section 4 becomes
infinite. This would be a rather undesirable feature of the model and would create unwanted discontinuities. We give
potential solutions to extend the model in this direction in Appendix F.2, but leave the exact study to future research.
3 The pure moral hazard case
In this section, we assume that the type of the bank is publicly known and is fixed to be some ρi, i ∈ {g, b}, which makes
the problem exactly similar to the one considered in [51] (up to the modification of some constants). In particular, the
investor only offers one contract. The results we obtain here, in particular the dynamics of the continuation utilities of
the banks, will be crucial to the study of the shutdown and screening contracts later on. Therefore, they will be used
throughout the paper without further references.
In this setting, the utility of the investor, when he offers a contract (ki, θi, Di) ∈ K×Θ×D is given by
vpm0 (k
i, θi, Di) := EP
ki
[ ∫ τ
0
(
I −Ns
)
µds− dDis
]
, (3.1)
for which we define the following dynamic version for any t ≥ 0
vpmt (k
i, θi, Di) := EP
ki
[ ∫ τ
t∧τ
(
I −Ns
)
µds− dDis
∣∣∣∣Gt].
3.1 The bank’s problem
As usual, the so–called continuation value of the bank (that is to say her future expected payoff) when offered (θi, Di) ∈
Θ×D plays a central role in the analysis. It is defined, for any (t, k) ∈ R+ × K by
uit(k, θ
i, Di) := EP
k
[ ∫ τ
t∧τ
e−r(s−t)
(
ρidD
i
s + ksBds
)∣∣∣∣Gt].
We also define the value function of the bank for any t ≥ 0
U it (θ
i, Di) := ess sup
k∈K
uit(k, θ
i, Di).
Departing slightly from the usual approach in the literature, initiated notably by Sannikov [60, 61], we reinterpret
the problem of the bank in terms of BSDEs, which, we believe, offers an alternative approach which may be easier to
apprehend for the mathematical finance community. Of course, such an interpretation of optimal stochastic control
problem with control on the drift is far from being original, and we refer the interested reader to the seminal papers
of Hamadène and Lepeltier [29] and El Karoui and Quenez [19] for more information, as well as to the recent articles
by Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi [12, 13] for more references and a systematic treatment of Principal–Agent type
problems with this backward SDE approach. Before stating the related result, let us denote by (Y i, Zi) the unique
(super–)solution (existence and uniqueness will be justified below) to the following BSDE
Y it = 0−
∫ τ
t
gi(s, Y is , Z
i
s)ds+
∫ τ
t
Zis · dM˜ is +
∫ τ
t
dKis, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, P− a.s., (3.2)
where
Mt :=
(
Nt
Ht
)
, M˜ it := Mt −
∫ t
0
λ0s
(
1
1− θis
)
ds, Kit := ρiD
i
t, f
i(t, k, y, z) := ry −Bk + kαI−Ntεz ·
(
1
1− θit
)
,
gi(t, y, z) := inf
k∈{0,...,I−Nt}
f i(t, k, y, z) = ry − (I −Nt)
(
αI−Ntεz ·
(
1
1− θit
)
−B
)−
.
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Uniqueness holds among processes Y i and Zi which are respectively G−progressively measurable and continuous, and
G−predictable, and satisfy
EP
[
sup
0≤t≤τ
e(βε
2−2r)t∣∣Y it ∣∣2] < +∞, and EP[ ∫ τ
0
e(βε
2−2r)s‖Zis‖2ds
]
< +∞, (3.3)
where β is the exponent associated to Di by (2.3). We have the following proposition, which is basically a reformulation
of [51, Proposition 3.2]. The proof is postponed to Appendix A
Proposition 3.1. For any (θi, Di) ∈ Θ×D, the value function of the bank has the dynamics, for t ∈ [0, τ ], P− a.s.
dU it (θ
i, Di) =
(
rU it (θ
i, Di)−Bk?,it + λk
?,i
t Z
i
t ·
(
1
1− θit
))
dt− ρidDit − Zit · dM˜ it ,
where Zi is the second component of the solution to the BSDE (3.2). In particular, the optimal monitoring choice of
the bank is given by
k?,it = (I −Nt)1{Zit ·(1,1−θit)><bt}, with bt :=
B
αI−Ntε
, t ≥ 0.
Notice that the above result implies that the monitoring choices of the bank are necessarily of bang–bang type, in the
sense that she either monitors all the remaining loans, or none at all, which in turn implies that the investor can never
give the bank incentives to monitor only a fraction of the loans at a given time5.
3.2 Introducing feasible sets
Following the terminology of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [14], let us discuss the so–called feasible set for the banks.
Definition 3.1. We call Vit the feasible set for the expected payoff of banks of type ρi, starting from some time t ≥ 0,
that is to say all the possible utilities that a bank of type ρi can get from all the admissible contracts offered by the
investor from time t on.
Our next result gives an explicit form of the the feasible set Vit , which turns out to be independent of the type of the
bank. The proof is relegated to Appendix A, and requires the introduction of kSH, the strategy of a bank which does
not monitor any loan at any time, i.e. kSHs := I −Ns for every s ≥ 0
Lemma 3.1. For i ∈ {g, b} and for any t ≥ 0, we have that Vit = Vt, with
Vt :=
[
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,+∞
)
.
4 Credible set
In this section we come back to the case in which there are two types of banks in the market, and study the so–called
credible set, which is formed by the pairs of value functions of the banks under the admissible contracts. As in [14],
we do not expect all the points in the feasible set to correspond to a pair of reachable values of the banks under some
admissible contract. We will therefore follow the approach initiated by [14] and we will characterise the credible set.
We emphasise an important difference with [14] though, in the sense that in our context, the credible set becomes
dynamic as it depends on the current size of the pool. In this section we work with generic contracts (θ,D) ∈ Θ×D,
not necessarily designed for a particular type of bank.
4.1 Definition of the credible set and its boundaries
We introduce some notations first. Let λ̂SHj be the default intensity under kSH when there are j loans left, that is to
say
λ̂SHj := αjj(1 + ε).
5We assume here, as is commonplace in the Principal–Agent literature, that in the case where the bank is indifferent with respect to
her monitoring decision, that is when Zit · (1, 1 − θit)> = bt, she acts in the best interest of the investors, and thus monitors all the I −Nt
remaining loans.
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Observe that λ̂SHj = λk
SH
t = αI−Nt(I −Nt)(1 + ε), for every t ≥ 0 such that I −Nt = j. Define then for any integer j
between 1 and I, the set V̂j :=
[
Bj/
(
r + λ̂SHj
)
,∞). Observe that the feasible set
Vt =
[
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,+∞
)
,
satisfies Vt = V̂I−Nt for every t ≥ 0, so the only dependence of the feasible set in time is due to the number of loans
left. The rigorous definition of the credible set is the following.
Definition 4.1. For any time t ≥ 0, we define the credible set Ct as the set of (ub, ug) ∈ Vt × Vt such that there exists
some admissible contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ × D satisfying U bt (θ,D) = ub, Ugt (θ,D) = ug and (U bs (θ,D), Ugs (θ,D)) ∈ Vs × Vs
for every s ∈ [t, τ), P−a.s.
Given a starting time t ≥ 0 and ub ∈ Vt, define the set of contracts under which the value function of the bad bank at
time t is equal to ub
Ab(t, ub) := {(θ,D) ∈ Θ×D : U bt (θ,D) = ub}.
We denote by Ut(ub) the largest value U
g
t (θ,D) that the good bank can obtain from all the contracts (θ,D) ∈ Ab(t, ub).
We also denote the lowest value by Lt(ub). Next, define
Ct :=
{
(ub, ug) ∈ Vt × Vt : Lt(ub) ≤ ug ≤ Ut(ub)
}
.
We will prove in Proposition 4.4 below that Ct = Ct for every t ≥ 0, and that the dependence on time of the credible
set, exactly as for the feasible set, only comes from the value of I −Nt. In particular, this allows us to call respectively
the functions Lt and Ut the lower and upper boundary of the credible set when there are I − Nt loans left. The aim
of the next sections is prove all these claims and to obtain explicit formulas for the boundaries. We start with some
useful technical results concerning specific contracts for which the banks do not monitor the loans at all.
4.2 Utility of not monitoring
Consider any starting time t such that I − Nt = j and any θ ∈ Θ. The continuation utility that the banks get from
always shirking (without considering the payments) is
ugt
(
kSH, θ, 0
)
= ubt
(
kSH, θ, 0
)
= EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t∧τ
e−r(s−t)BkSHs ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]. (4.1)
This quantity is obviously non–decreasing in θ, so that (4.1) attains its minimum value under any contract with θ ≡ 0,
which is equal to c(j, 1) := Bj/
(
r + λ̂SHj
)
. The following proposition provides the value of (4.1) when the pool is
liquidated exactly after a fixed number of defaults m.
Proposition 4.1. Fix some t ≥ 0 and let j := I−Nt. For m ∈ {1, . . . , j}, let θm ∈ Θ be such that the pool is liquidated
exactly after the mth default occurring after time t, that is
θms :=
{
1, t ≤ s ≤ τNt+m,
0, s > τNt+m.
The utility that the bank of type ρi gets from shirking is
c(j,m) :=
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
+
j−1∑
i=j−m+1
Bi
r + λ̂SHi
j∏
`=i+1
λ̂SH`
r + λ̂SH`
.
In particular, under any contract such that θ ≡ 1, (4.1) attains its maximum value, which is equal to
C(j) := c(j, j) =
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
+
j−1∑
i=1
Bi
r + λ̂SHi
j∏
`=i+1
λ̂SH`
r + λ̂SH`
. (4.2)
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4.3 Lower boundary of the credible set
The lower boundary of the credible set is the simpler of the two boundaries and it can be computed directly. We will
see that it is a piecewise linear function corresponding to two lines with different slopes. All proofs for this section are
collected in Appendix C. The next proposition states the main inequalities that determine the lower boundary.
Lemma 4.1. For any t ∈ [0, τ ] and any admissible contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ × D, the value functions of the good and the
bad banks satisfy, P−a.s.
Ugt (θ,D) ≥ U bt (θ,D), (4.3)
Ugt (θ,D) ≥
ρg
ρb
U bt (θ,D)−
(ρg − ρb)
ρb
C(I −Nt), (4.4)
where the function C is defined in (4.2).
Using Lemma 4.1, we prove the following characterisation of the lower boundary of the credible set.
Proposition 4.2. For any t ≥ 0, and any ub ∈ Vt, the lower boundary of the credible set is given by
Lt(u
b) =
u
b, c(I −Nt, 1) ≤ ub ≤ C(I −Nt),
ρg
ρb
ub − (ρg − ρb)
ρb
C(I −Nt), C(I −Nt) ≤ ub < +∞.
In particular, the dependence in t of Lt(ub) only comes from the number of non–defaulted loans at time t and we can
define for any j ∈ {1, . . . , I}, the quantity L̂j(ub) given by
L̂j(u
b) :=
u
b, c(j, 1) ≤ ub ≤ C(j),
ρg
ρb
ub − (ρg − ρb)
ρb
C(j), C(j) ≤ ub < +∞,
for which we have L̂I−Nt(ub) = Lt(ub).
Remark 4.1. Of course, the computations of this section depend on our modelling choices, and are unlikely to be
directly adaptable to other situations. There is however a generic way of finding the lower boundary (as well as the
upper one) which we give details in the next section. It amounts to solving a fictitious contract situation where the good
bank hires the bad one and minimises (maximises for the upper boundary) her utility over her monitoring choices, and
over all contracts for which the bad bank receives a fixed utility ub. The dynamic value function of this control problem
is exactly Lt(ub), since it corresponds to the minimal utility that the good bank can have when the bad one receives ub.
4.4 Upper boundary of the credible set
The upper boundary of the credible set is not as simple to obtain as the lower boundary and we have to solve a specific
stochastic control problem to identify it. Notice that this approach is similar to the one used in [14].
Let us fix any contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ × D. We remind the reader that thanks to Proposition 3.1, we know that there
exist G−predictable integrable processes (h1,g(θ,D), h2,g(θ,D)) satisfying the second integrability condition in (3.3)
and such that
dUgs (θ,D) =
(
rUgs (θ,D)−Bk?,gs (θ,D)
)
ds− ρgdDs − h1,gs (θ,D)
(
dNs − λk?,g(θ,D)s ds
)
− h2,gs (θ,D)
(
dHs − (1− θs)λk?,g(θ,D)s ds
)
, s ∈ [0, τ ], (4.5)
where the optimal monitoring choice k?,g(θ,D) is given by k?,gs (θ,D) = (I−Ns)1{h1,gs (θ,D)+(1−θs)h2,gs (θ,D)<bs}. Similarly,
there exist G−predictable processes (h1,b(θ,D), h2,b(θ,D)) satisfying the second integrability condition in (3.3) and such
that
dU bs (θ,D) =
(
rU bs (θ,D)−Bk?,bs (θ,D)
)
ds− ρbdDs − h1,bs (θ,D)
(
dNs − λk?,b(θ,D)s ds
)
− h2,bs (θ,D)
(
dHs − (1− θs)λk?,b(θ,D)s ds
)
, s ∈ [0, τ ], (4.6)
with k?,bs (θ,D) = (I −Ns)1{h1,bs (θ,D)+(1−θs)h2,bs (θ,D)<bs}. We will use the dynamics (4.5)–(4.6) to define a simple set of
admissible contracts in which we will reinterpret both the value functions of the agents as controlled diffusion processes,
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where the controls are (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b), and which satisfy the instantaneous conditions (A.3). Obviously, doing
so makes us, at least at first sight, look at a larger class of "contracts", in the sense that in the above representation of
the value functions of the bank, the choice of the processes (h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b) is not free, since they are completely
determined by the choice of (θ,D). Nonetheless, as we will see below, this still describes exactly the same set of
contracts.
In the meantime, let us denote by H the set of non–negative, G−predictable processes h satisfying for some β > 0
EP
[ ∫ τ
0
e(βε
2−2r)s|hs|2ds
]
< +∞.
We abuse notations and define, for every Ψ := (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b) ∈ D×Θ×H4, the processes Ug(Ψ) and U b(Ψ)
which satisfy the following SDEs
dUgs (Ψ) =
(
rUgs (Ψ)−Bk?,gs (Ψ)
)
ds− ρgdDs − h1,gs
(
dNs − λk?,g(Ψ)s ds
)− h2,gs (dHs − (1− θs)λk?,g(Ψ)s ds), (4.7)
dU bs (Ψ) =
(
rU bs (Ψ)−Bk?,bs (Ψ)
)
ds− ρbdDs − h1,bs
(
dNs − λk?,b(Ψ)s ds
)− h2,bs (dHs − (1− θs)λk?,b(Ψ)s ds), (4.8)
where we defined
k?,gs (Ψ) := (I −Ns)1{h1,gs +(1−θs)h2,gs <bs}, k?,bs (Ψ) := (I −Ns)1{h1,bs +(1−θs)h2,bs <bs}.
Remark 4.2. In the model, there is no need to consider h1,g and h1,b as positive processes and we do this just for
technical reasons. Intuitively, the optimal contracts should satisfy this additional constraint because the investor does
not benefit from earlier defaults and if a contract increases the banks’ continuation utilities after one of the defaults,
the banks should increase the default intensity as much as possible.
Remark 4.3. It is immediate from the definition that given Ψ := (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b) ∈ D×Θ×H4, the dynamics
of Ug(Ψ) only depends on (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g), while the dynamics of U b(Ψ) only depends on (D, θ, h1,b, h2,b). We will thus
sometimes also use the notations Ug(Ψ), U b(Ψ), k?,g(Ψ) and k?,b(Ψ) when Ψ ∈ D ×Θ×H2.
For fixed (t, ub, ug) ∈ R+ ×V2t , we define the set of contracts A(t, ub, ug) as the set of Ψ := (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b) ∈
D ×Θ×H4 such that (4.7) and (4.8) have at least one weak solution6, which satisfies the first integrability condition
in (3.3), and in addition
U is−(Ψ) = h
1,i
s + h
2,i
s , U
i
s−(Ψ)− h1,is ≥
B(I −Ns)
r + λSHs
, ∀s ∈ [t, τ ], U it (Ψ) = ui, i ∈ {b, g}.
What we claimed above is that all processes (D, θ) ∈ D×Θ can be obtained from a contract (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b, h2,b) =:
Ψ ∈ A(0, ub, ug), meaning that we are not enlarging at all the class of admissible contracts in our reformulation. Indeed,
we already know by the results from Section 3, that the continuation utilities of the good and the bad bank given a
contract (D, θ) ∈ D×Θ were completely characterised as being the unique solutions of the corresponding BSDEs (3.2)
satisfying in addition (3.3). If we take some Ψ ∈ A(0, ub, ug), then it is immediate that the processes Ug(Ψ), U b(Ψ)
solve the corresponding BSDEs (3.2), since the dynamics is the correct one by definition, we have Ugτ (Ψ) = U bτ (Ψ) = 0,
and all the required integrability conditions are satisfied. By uniqueness of the solution to the BSDEs, we thus must
have Ug(Ψ) = Ug(θ,D), and U b(Ψ) = U b(θ,D).
To describe the stochastic control problem for the upper boundary of the credible set, we need to introduce additional
notations. For any starting time t ∈ [0, τ ] and for every ub ≥ B(I − Nt)/
(
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
)
, we let Ab(t, ub) be the set of
quadruplets Ψ = (D, θ, h1,b, h2,b) ∈ D ×Θ×H2 such that (4.8) has at least one weak solution, which satisfies the first
integrability condition in (3.3) as well as
U bs−(Ψ) = h
1,b
s + h
2,b
s , U
b
s−(Ψ)− h1,bs ≥
B(I −Ns)
r + λI−Nss
, ∀s ∈ [t, τ ], U bt (Ψ) = ub.
We will abuse notations and also call elements of Ab(t, ub) contracts. The upper boundary Ut solves the following
control problem
Ut(u
b) = ess sup
(kg,Ψ)∈K×Ab(t,ub)
EP
kg
[ ∫ τ
t∧τ
e−r(s−t)
(
ρgdDs +Bk
g
sds
)∣∣∣∣Gt],
6In general, all the processes in Ψ could for instance functionals of the paths of Ug(Ψ) and Ub(Ψ), in which case wellposedness of the
SDEs has to be assumed as part of the definition.
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subject to the dynamics
U br (Ψ) = u
b +
∫ r
t
(
rubs −Bk?,bs (Ψ) + h1,bs λk
?,b
s + h
2,b
s (1− θs)λk
?,b
s
)
ds− ρbdDs −
∫ r
t
h1,bs dNs −
∫ r
t
h2,bs dHs, r ∈ [t, τ ].
Indeed, the above stochastic control problem corresponds to the highest value that the good bank can obtain from any
admissible contract, while ensuring that when the bad bank takes said contract, she receives exactly ub, which is exactly
the definition of the upper boundary of the credible set. Another way to interpret this problem is that it corresponds
to the (fictitious) situation where the good bank hires the bad one, when the latter wants to receive a utility of ub,
and maximises her utility among all contracts ensuring that this constraint is satisfied. The importance of the results
of Proposition 3.1 is that it allows us to obtain easily the dynamic behaviour of the continuation utility of the bad
bank for any initial utility, which in turns allows us to express simply the constraint in the problem for the good bank
through the set Ab and the state variable U b(Ψ).
The next subsections are devoted to first obtaining the HJB equation associated with the above problem, its resolution
and then finally to the proof of a verification theorem adapted to our framework. Notice that the above is actually a
singular stochastic control problem, since the control D is a non–decreasing process, which is not necessarily absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We refer the reader to the monograph by Fleming and Soner [24] for
more details. In particular, this implies that the HJB equation associated to the problem will be a variational inequality
with gradient constraints.
4.4.1 HJB equation for the upper boundary
Exactly as in the case of the lower boundary, we expect that the time dependence of of the upper boundary only comes
from the current number of remaining loans. In such a case, the HJB equations that will describe the behaviour of the
upper boundary necessarily form a recursive system, with the upper boundary when j loans are left depending on the
one with j − 1 loans left. We will write down this system, solve it explicitly, and prove a verification theorem ensuring
that our initial guess was indeed correct.
Fix some 1 ≤ j ≤ I, and define for every k = 0, 1, · · · , j, λ̂kj := αj(j + kε). The system of HJB equations associated to
the previous control problem is given by Û0 ≡ 0, and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ I and ub ≥ Bj
r+λ̂SHj
min
{
− sup
(θ,h1,h2)∈Cj
{
Û ′j(ub)
(
ub −Bkb + (h1 + (1− θ)h2)λ̂kbj
)
+λ̂k
g
j θÛj−1(ub − h1)− (λ̂k
g
j + r)Ûj(ub) +Bkg
}
, Û ′j(ub)−
ρg
ρb
}
= 0, (4.9)
with the additional boundary condition Ûj(Bj/(r + λ̂SHj )) = Bj/(r + λ̂SHj ), and where we defined for simplicity
kb := j1{h1+(1−θ)h2<b̂j}, k
g := j1{Ûj(ub)−θÛj−1(ub−h1)<b̂j},
as well as
Cj :=
{
(θ, h1, h2) ∈ [0, 1]× R2+ : h1 + h2 = ub, h2 ≥
B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
}
.
Remark 4.4. Notice that if our guess on the time dependence of the upper boundary is correct, we must have for any
s ≥ 0, Us = ÛI−Ns . Then. the incentive compatibility condition for the good bank is implicit in the HJB equation.
Indeed, at every s ≥ 0 we have
ÛI−Ns
(
U bs (Ψ)
)− ÛI−Ns− (U bs−(Ψ)) = (ÛI−Ns−−1(U bs−(Ψ)− h1,bs (Ψ))− ÛI−Ns− (U bs−(Ψ)))∆Ns
− ÛI−Ns−−1
(
U bs−(Ψ)− h1,bs (Ψ)
)
∆Hs,
which implies that on the upper boundary h1,gs (Ψ) = ÛI−Ns−
(
U bs−(Ψ)
) − ÛI−Ns−−1(U bs−(Ψ) − h1,bs (Ψ)) and h2,gs (Ψ) =
ÛI−Ns−−1
(
U bs−(Ψ)− h1,bs (Ψ)
)
. Therefore
h1,gs (Ψ) + (1− θgs)h2,gs (Ψ) = ÛI−Ns−
(
U bs−(Ψ)
)− θgs ÛI−Ns−−1(U bs−(Ψ)− h1,bs (Ψ)).
At the points where Û ′j(ub) > ρg/ρb, the first term of the variational inequality (4.9) must be equal to zero, so the
upper boundary must satisfy the following equation
rÛj(ub) = sup
(θ,h1,h2)∈Cj
{
Û ′j(ub)
(
rub −Bkb + (h1 + (1− θ)h2)λ̂kbj
)
+
(Ûj−1(ub − h1)θ − Ûj(ub))λ̂kgj +Bkg}. (4.10)
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We will refer to this equation as the diffusion equation.
• Step 1: case of 1 loan, solving the diffusion equation
Before dealing with the variational inequality (4.9), we will solve the diffusion equation (4.10). When j = 1, it reduces
to
rÛ1(ub) = Û ′1(ub)
(
rub −Bkb + ubλ̂kb1
)− Û1(ub)λ̂kg1 +Bkg, (4.11)
with kb = 1{ub<b̂1}, k
g = 1{Û(ub)<b̂1}.
Remark 4.5. Notice that the boundary condition Û1
(
B
r+λ̂11
)
= B
r+λ̂11
is implicit in the equation.
Our first result is the following, whose proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Lemma 4.2. There is a family of continuously differentiable solutions to the diffusion equation (4.10), indexed by some
constant C0 > 0, which are given by
ÛC01 (ub) :=

C
r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01
0
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
, ub ∈
[
B
r + λ̂11
, xC0,?1
)
,
C0b̂
λ̂11−λ̂01
r+λ̂11
1
(
r + λ̂11
r + λ̂01
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
, ub ∈ [xC0,?1 , b̂1),
C0u
b, ub ∈ [̂b1,+∞),
where xC0,?1 :=
(
1
C0
) r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01
b̂1
r + λ̂01
r + λ̂11
+
B
r + λ̂11
.
• Step 2: case of 1 loan, solving the HJB equation
In this case the variational inequality (4.9) reduces to
min
{
rÛ1(ub)− Û ′(ub)
(
rub −Bkb + ubλ̂kb1
)
+ Û1(ub)λ̂kg1 −Bkg, Û ′1(ub)−
ρg
ρb
}
= 0. (4.12)
We already found the solutions of the diffusion equation inside of this variational inequality and now we will take care of
the whole HJB equation. We expect the upper boundary to saturate the second term in the variational inequality for big
values of ub, so we will search for a solution of (4.12) satisfying the following condition: there exists x? ∈ [B/(r+λ̂11),∞)
such that
Û ′1(x?) =
ρg
ρb
and Û ′1(ub) >
ρg
ρb
, for ub < x?. (4.13)
At first sight it could seem that by doing this we face the risk of not finding the correct solution of the dynamic
programming equation. Nevertheless, this is not the case and we will prove later a verification result which assures us
that the solution that we find under this condition corresponds indeed to the upper boundary of the credible set. The
proof of the following Lemma will be given in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.3. The unique solution of the HJB equation (4.12) which satisfies condition (4.13) is given by, defining
x?1 := x
ρg/ρb,?
1
Û?1 (ub) := Ûρg/ρb1 (ub) =

(
ρg
ρb
) r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
, ub ∈
[
B
r + λ̂11
, x?1
)
,
ρg
ρb
b̂
λ̂11−λ̂01
r+λ̂11
1
(
r + λ̂11
r + λ̂01
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
, ub ∈ [x?1, b̂1),
ρg
ρb
ub, ub ∈ [̂b1,+∞).
(4.14)
As an illustration, in Figure 1 we show the credible set which corresponds to the region delimited by its upper and
lower boundaries. In this example, we considered r = 0.02, B = 0.002, ε = 0.25, α1 = 0.055,
ρg
ρb
= 2.
• Step 3: solving the HJB equation in the general case
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Br+λ̂11
x?1 b̂1
B
r+λ̂11
b̂1
ρg
ρb
b̂1 u
g = ub
L̂1(u
b)Û?1 (ub)
ub
ug
Figure 1: Credible set with one loan left.
In the general case, when j > 1, we can reduce the number of variables and rewrite the diffusion equation (4.10) in an
equivalent form
rÛj(ub) = sup
(θ,h1)∈Ĉj
{
Û ′j(ub)
(
rub −Bkb + [ub − θ(ub − h1)]λ̂kbj
)
+
(Ûj−1(ub − h1)θ − Ûj(ub))λ̂kgj +Bkg}, (4.15)
where we recall that kb = 1{ub−θ(ub−h1)<b̂j}, k
g = 1{Ûj(ub)−θÛj−1(ub−h1)<b̂j} and the set of constraints is now given by
Ĉj :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ [0, 1]× R+, ub ≥ h1 + B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
}
. (4.16)
When we proved that the lower boundary of the credible set is reachable we used contracts of maximum duration,
which maintain the pool until the last default. This gives us the intuition that the longer the contract lasts, the smaller
the difference between the utilities of the banks will be. Therefore the upper boundary of the credible set, where the
difference between both utilities is maximal, should be reachable with contracts of minimum duration, which terminate
the contractual relationship immediately after the first default. In the model this means that θ is equal to zero and
the resulting HJB equation for the upper boundary has the same form as the one in the case with one loan left. We
expect then that the solution of the diffusion equation will be the of the same form as (4.14). The object of the next
proposition is to prove our guess rigorously. We postpone the proof to Appendix D.
Proposition 4.3. For any j ≥ 1, the function Û?j defined by
Û?j (ub) :=

(
ρg
ρb
) r+λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j
(
ub − Bj
r + λ̂SHj
)
+
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
, ub ∈
[
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
, x?j
)
,
ρg
ρb
b̂
λ̂SHj −λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
j
(
r + λ̂SHj
r + λ̂0j
) r+λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
(
ub − Bj
r + λ̂SHj
) r+λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
, ub ∈ [x?j , b̂j),
ρg
ρb
ub, ub ∈ [̂bj ,+∞),
(4.17)
where x?j :=
(
ρb
ρg
) r+λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j
b̂j
r + λ̂0j
r + λ̂SHj
+
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
, is a solution of the HJB equation (4.9).
4.4.2 Verification theorem
According to the maximisers in equation (4.15) we define the following controls
δj(ub) := 1{ub≥b̂j}
ub(r + λ̂0j )
ρb
, θj(ub) := 0,
h1,b,j(ub) := ub − B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
, h2,b,j(ub) :=
B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
,
kb,j(ub) := j1{ub<b̂j}, k
g,j(ub) := j1{Û?j (ub)<b̂j}.
(4.18)
14
Before stating the verification result for the upper boundary, we make a comment about the domain of the functions
Û?j . Rigorously speaking, it is possible for the utilities of the banks to be zero but this happens only at time τ when all
the pools are liquidated. The domain of Û?j is the set V̂j but in the proof of the verification theorem it will be implicitly
understood that Û?j (0) = 0. In any case, we do not need the functions Û?j to be defined at zero because Itô’s formula
will be used on intervals which do not contain τ .
Theorem 4.1. Consider any starting time t ≥ 0. For any ub ≥ B(I−Nt)
r+λ̂SHI−Nt
, let the process (ubs)s∈[t,τ ] be the unique
solution of the following SDE
ubv = u
b +
∫ v
t
((
r + λk
b,I−Ns
s
)
ubs −Bkb,I−Ns(ubs)− ρbδI−Ns(ubs)
)
ds−
∫ v
t
ubs−dNs, v ∈ [t, τ ]. (4.19)
Then, under the contract Ψ? := (D?, θ?, h1,b,?, h2,b,?) ∈ D ×Θ×H2 defined for s ∈ [t, τ ] by
dD?s := δ
I−Ns(ubs)ds, θ
?
s ≡ 0, h1,b,?s := h1,b,I−Ns(ubs), h2,b,?s := h2,b,I−Ns(ubs),
the value function of the bad bank is U bt (Ψ?) = ub and the one of good bank is U
g
t (Ψ
?) = Û?I−Nt(ub). Moreover,
Ψ? ∈ Ab(t, ub) and for any other contract which belongs to Ab(t, ub), the value function of the good bank under such a
contract is less or equal to Û?I−Nt(ub). In particular, this implies that
Û?I−Nt(ub) = ÛI−Nt(ub) = Ut(ub).
To conclude the section, we state that Cj is indeed equal to the credible set with j loans left and therefore the functions
Ûj and L̂j correspond to its upper and lower boundaries.
Proposition 4.4. For every t ≥ 0, Ct = Ct.
5 Optimal contracts
In this section we study two kind of contracts that the investor can offer to the bank, the shutdown contract, which
corresponds to a single contract designed to be accepted only by the good bank and the screening contract, corresponding
to a menu of contracts, one for each type of agent, providing incentives to the bank to accept the contract designed for
her true type.
5.1 Shutdown contract
In the so–called shutdown contract, the investor designs a contract Ψg = (kg, Dg, θg) only for the good bank and makes
sure that the bad bank will not accept it. Under these conditions the utility of the investor at time t = 0 is
vg,Shut0 (Ψg) = pgE
Pkg
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
]
. (5.1)
So the investor will offer a contract which maximises (5.1) subject to the constraints
ug0(k
g, θg, Dg) ≥ Rg0, sup
k∈K
ub0(k, θ
g, Dg) ≤ Rb0, ug0(kg, θg, Dg) = sup
k∈K
ug0(k, θ
g, Dg).
Recalling the dynamics (4.5)–(4.6), we can rewrite the investor’s maximisation problem as follows
vShut0 := sup
(θg,Dg)∈AgShut
pgEP
k?,g(θg,Dg)
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
]
,
where
AgShut :=
{
(θg, Dg) ∈ Θ×D : U b,c0 (θg, Dg) ≤ Rb0, Ug0 (θg, Dg) ≥ Rg0
}
.
Remark 5.1. We will use the notation U b,c(θg, Dg) for the value function that the bad bank gets if she does not reveal
her true type and accepts the contract designed for the good bank. We make a distinction between this process and
U b(θb, Db), which corresponds to the value function that the bad bank obtains if she accepts the contract designed for her
by the investor. We make the same distinction between the associated processes h1,b,c(θ,D), h2,b,c(θ,D) and h1,b(θ,D),
h2,b(θ,D).
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As in the previous section, we will define a simple set of contracts and consider the value functions of the agents as
diffussion processes controlled by (D, θ, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b,c, h2,b,c). As explained before, by doing so we do not look at a
larger class of "contracts".
Define for any (t, ug, ub,c) ∈ [0,+∞)×Ct, Âg(t, ug, ub,c) to be the set of Ψg = (Dg, θg, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b,c, h2,b,c) ∈ D×Θ×H4
such that (4.7) and (4.8) have at least one weak solution, which satisfy the first integrability condition in (3.3), and in
addition, for any s ∈ [t, τ ]
Ugs−(Ψg) = h
1,g
s + h
2,g
s , U
g
s−(Ψg)− h1,gs ≥
B(I −Ns)
r + λI−Nss
, Ugt (Ψg) = u
g,
U b,cs− (Ψg) = h
1,b,c
s + h
2,b,c
s , U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs ≥
B(I −Ns)
r + λI−Nss
, U b,ct (Ψg) = u
b,c.
We will also consider in the sequel the following standard control problem, for any (ub,c, ug) ∈ C0
v̂g0(u
b,c, ug) := sup
Ψg∈Âg(0,ug,ub,c)
pgEP
k?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
]
.
We abuse notations and also call elements of Âg(t, ug, ub,c) contracts.
5.1.1 Value function of the investor
In this section, we characterise the value function of the investor when he offers only shutdown contracts. We will start
by computing the value function on the boundaries of the credible set, before explaining how it can be characterised by
a specific HJB equation in the interior of the credible set, under reasonable assumptions.
Value function of the investor on the lower boundary Recall the lower boundary with j loans left
L̂j(u
b,c) =
u
b,c, c(j, 1) ≤ ub,c ≤ C(j),
ρg
ρb
ub,c − (ρg − ρb)
ρb
C(j), C(j) ≤ ub,c <∞.
Consider any starting time t ≥ 0. For ub,c ∈ Ct, we denote by V L,g(ub,c) the value function of the investor on the lower
boundary, that is
V L,gt (u
b,c) := ess sup
Ψg∈Âg(t,L̂I−Nt (ub,c),ub,c)
EP
k?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
t
(
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
)∣∣∣∣Gt]. (5.2)
The following two propositions are proved in Appendix E and give explicitly the value of V L,gt (ub,c).
Proposition 5.1. For every ub,c ∈ Ct, if ub,c ≥ C(I−Nt) then the value function of the investor on the lower boundary
is given by
V L,gt (u
b,c) =
I−1∑
i=Nt
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
−
(
ub,c − C(I −Nt)
ρb
)
.
Proposition 5.2. Fix some t ≥ 0. For every ub,c ∈ Ct, with c(I −Nt, 1) ≤ ub,c < C(I −Nt), let ν(ub,c) be the unique
solution of the following equation in ν(
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
− ub,c
)
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
(
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−rx
)
fτ i(x)dx = 0,
where fτ i is the density of the law of τ i under Pk
SH
and where
si(ν) :=

0, ν ≤ µ(r + λ̂
SH
I−i)
Bλ̂SHI−i
,
1
r
ln
(
νBλ̂SHI−i
µ(r + λ̂SHI−i)
)
, ν ≥ µ(r + λ̂
SH
I−i)
Bλ̂SHI−i
.
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Then the value function of the investor in the lower boundary is given by
V L,gt (u
b,c) =
µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν(ub,c))
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
fτ i(x)dx.
Remark 5.2. Observe that the function V L,gt computed in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 depends on t only through the
quantity I −Nt. Define, for any j = 1, . . . , J the map
V̂ L,gj (u
b,c) :=

j∑
i=1
µi
λ̂SHi
−
(
ub,c − C(j)
ρb
)
, ub,c ≥ C(j),
µj
λ̂SHj
+
j−1∑
i=1
∫ ∞
sI−j(ν(ub,c))
µi
λ̂SHi
fτI−i(x)dx, u
b,c ∈ (c(j, 1), C(j)) .
We have therefore, that V L,gt (ub,c) = V̂
L,g
I−Nt(u
b,c).
Value function of the investor on the upper boundary The next proposition states that the upper boundary
of the credible set is absorbing in the following sense: if under any contract the pair of value functions of the banks
reaches the upper boundary at some time, the pair will stay on the upper boundary until the pool is liquidated.
Proposition 5.3. Fix a triplet (t, ug, ub,c) ∈ [0,+∞) × Ct such that ug = ÛI−Nt(ub,c). For any contract Ψg =
(Dg, θg, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b,c, h2,b,c) ∈ Âg(t, ug, ub,c), we have Ugs (Ψg) = ÛI−Ns(U b,cs (Ψg)) for every s ∈ [t, τ).
The next proposition states an important property satisfied by the contracts which make the continuation utilities of
the banks lie in the upper boundary of the credible set.
Proposition 5.4. Fix a triplet (t, ug, ub,c) ∈ [0,+∞) × Ct such that ug = ÛI−Nt(ub,c). For any contract Ψg =
(Dg, θg, h1,g, h2,g, h1,b,c, h2,b,c) ∈ Âg(t, ug, ub,c), we have
(i) θgs = 0 for every s ∈ [t, τ) such that U b,cs (Ψg) < bs.
(ii) If U b,cs0 (Ψg) ≥ bs0 for some s0 ∈ [t, τ) then k?,b,cs (Ψg) = 0 and U b,cs (Ψg) ≥ bs for every s ∈ [s0, τ).
We are now ready to give the value function of the investor on the upper boundary of the credible set. In the last region
of the upper boundary, in which both the good and the bad agent are monitoring all the loans, it coincides with the
value function of the sub–problem7 studied in[50], denoted by vbj . For the sake of presentation, we recall the results of
[50] in Appendix E.1.
Proposition 5.5. Under Assumption 2.1, we have that for any t ≥ 0 and any ub,c ∈ V̂I−Nt , the value function of the
investor on the upper boundary, defined by
V U,gt (u
b,c) := ess sup
Ψg∈Âg(t,ÛI−Nt (ub,c),ub,c)
EP
k?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
t
(
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
)∣∣∣∣Gt], (5.3)
verifies V U,gt (ub,c) = V̂
U,g
I−Nt(u
b,c), where for any j = 1, · · · , I
V̂ U,gj (u
b,c) :=

µj
λ̂SHj
+ Ĉj
(
ub,c − Bj
r + λ̂SHj
) λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
, ub,c < x?j ,
µj
λ̂0j
+
(
vbj (̂bj)−
µj
λ̂0j
)(
b̂j
r + λ̂0j
r + λ̂SHj
)− λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
(
ub,c − Bj
r + λ̂SHj
) λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
, x?j ≤ ub,c < b̂j ,
vbj(u
b,c), ub,c ≥ b̂j ,
with vbj given by (E.1) and
Ĉj :=
(
µj
λ̂0j
− µj
λ̂SHj
+
(
ρb
ρg
) λ̂0j
r+λ̂0
j
(
vbj (̂bj)−
µj
λ̂0j
))(
ρb
ρg
)− λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j
(
b̂j(r + λ̂
0
j )
r + λ̂SHj
)− λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
.
7The authors only look at the contracts for which the agent performs the maximum effort, that is, monitors all the loans at every time.
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Value function of the investor in the credible set We define, for any t ≥ 0 and any (ub,c, ug) ∈ ĈI−Nt , the value
function of the investor in the credible set by
V gt (u
b,c, ug) := ess sup
Ψg∈Âg(t,ug,ub,c)
EP
k?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
t
(
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
)∣∣∣∣Gt]. (5.4)
The system of HJB equations associated to this control problem is given by V̂ g0 ≡ 0, and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ I, on V̂j × V̂j
max

sup
C
j

∂ub,c V̂
g
j
(
rub,c −Bkb,c + (h1,b,c + (1− θ)h2,b,c)λ̂kb,cj
)
+∂ug V̂
g
j
(
rug −Bkg + (h1,g + (1− θ)h2,g)λ̂kgj
)
+
(
V̂ gj−1(u
b,c − h1,b,c, ug − h1,g)− V̂ gj (ub,c, ug)
)
λ̂k
g
j
−V̂ gj−1(ub,c − h1,b,c, ug − h1,g)(1− θ)λ̂k
g
j + µj

,−ρb∂ub,c V̂ gj − ρg∂ug V̂ gj − 1

= 0, (5.5)
where we defined kb,c = j · 1{h1,b,c+(1−θ)h2,b,c<b̂j}, kg = j · 1{h1,g+(1−θ)h2,g<b̂j} and the set of constraints
C
j
=
{
(θ, h1,b,c, h2,b,c, h1,g, h2,g) ∈ R5+ : θ ∈ [0, 1], ug = h1,g + h2,g, ub,c = h1,b,c + h2,b,c, h2,g;h2,b,c ≥
B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
}
.
The boundary conditions of (5.5) are given, for every ub,c ∈ V̂j , by
V̂ gj (u
b,c, Ûj(u
b,c)) = V̂ U,gj (u
b,c), V̂ gj (u
b,c, L̂j(u
b,c)) = V̂ L,gj (u
b,c). (5.6)
The last step is now to use classical arguments to prove that V̂ gj is a viscosity solution of the above PDE for every
j = 1, . . . , I and that the functions are sufficiently smooth (at least weakly dfferentiable) in order to obtain the optimal
contract as the maximisers above. This program can in principle be carried out using standard arguments in viscosity
theory of Hamilton–Jacobi equations. However, given the length of the paper, we believe that it would not serve a
specific purpose and decided to just describe the main steps that lead to this result. We list them below
(i) For j = 1, we can use the abstract results of [20] to prove that (5.4) coincides with the strong formulation of itself.
This fact allows to prove directly that the value function V̂ g1 is concave and therefore differentiable almost everywhere.
(ii) For j > 1, let us define the penalised Hamiltonians for the diffusion equation, with j loans left. Given V̂ gj−1, define
for instance
Hnj (u
b,c, ug, v, pb,c, pg) = sup
C
j

pb,c
(
rub,c −Bkb,c + (h1,b,c + (1− θ)h2,b,c)λkb,cj
)
+pg
(
rug −Bkg + (h1,g + (1− θ)h2,g)λ̂kgj
)
+
(
V̂ gj−1(u
b,c − h1,b,c, ug − h1,g)− v(ub,c, ug))λ̂kgj
−V̂ gj−1(ub,c − h1,b,c, ug − h1,g)(1− θ)λ̂k
g
j + µj

+n(−ρbpb,c− ρgpg − 1)+. (5.7)
Let vnj be the value function of the penalised version of our problem, in which payments are absolutely continuous
with bounded density. Then it can be argued as in [21] that vnj is a viscosity solution to Hnj (u, v, p) = 0, with
appropriate credible set and boundary conditions.
(iii) Note that Hnj is convex in p, as a supremum of linear functionals and composition of convex functions. Moreover,
for any R < +∞ we have
Hnj (u, v1, p)−Hnj (u, v2, p) ≥ −λ̂SHj (v1 − v2), ∀(u, p) and R ≥ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ −R.
Hnj is also locally Lipschitz and Hnj (u, v, p) −→ ∞ as |p| → ∞ for any u > Bjr+λ̂SHj . Finally, noticing that interior
maximisers take place in the interior of the credible set (to be more precise, boundary maximisers correspond to
contracts leading the agents to the absorbing boundaries of the credible set) and by using the envelope theorem, we
can show that Hnj is actually strictly convex on the interior of the credible set and therefore satisfies
∀R > 0,∃αR > 0,
(
∂Hnj
∂p
(u, v, p)− ∂H
n
j
∂p
(u, v, q), p− q
)
≥ αR|p− q|2, |p|, |q|, |u| ≤ R, for any u.
By Theorem 3.3 in Lions [37], it follows then that vnj ∈W 1,∞loc and vnj is SSH (semi–super harmonic).
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(iv) Arguing again as in [21], it can be proved the sequence vnj converges to the value function V̂
g
j of our problem, which
is therefore SSH and a viscosity solution to (5.5) with boundary condition (5.6).
Finally, since V̂ gj is differentiable almost everywhere, we can define the optimal contract through the maximisers in the
Hamiltonian (5.5). Then, using the classical result (see for instance [32] for related arguments) that the domain in which
the diffusion equation is not saturated is bounded, it follows that the optimal controls (h1,g,?, h2,g,?, h1,b,c,?, h2,b,c,?) are
bounded and the corresponding SDEs admit weak solutions
dU?,gs =
(
rU?,gs −Bk?,gs (U?,b,cs , U?,gs )− ρgδ?,gI−Ns(U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
)
ds− h?,1,gI−Ns(U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
(
dNs − λk?,g((U?,b,c,U?,g))s ds
)
− h?,2,gI−Ns(U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
(
dHs − (1− θ?,gI−Ns(U?,b,cs , U?,gs ))λk
?,g((U?,b,c,U?,g))
s ds
)
,
dU?,b,cs =
(
rU?,b,cs −Bk?,b,cs (U?,b,cs , U?,gs )− ρbδ?,gI−Ns(U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
)
ds− h?,1,b,cI−Ns (U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
(
dNs − λk?,b,c((U?,b,c,U?,g))s ds
)
− h?,2,b,cI−Ns (U?,b,cs , U?,gs )
(
dHs − (1− θ?,gs (U?,b,cs , U?,gs ))λk
?,b,c((U?,b,c,U?,g))
s ds
)
.
Indeed, this can be proved by noticing that in–between two jump times, the above are actually first–order ODEs,
which admit weak solutions in appropriately exponentially weighted L1 space (to make sure that bounded functions
are integrable over the credible set), thanks to Carathéodory’s theorem for ODEs. Thus, we have the equivalence
vShut0 = sup
ub,c≤Rb0, ug≥Rg0
v̂g0(u
b,c, ug) = sup
ub,c≤Rb0, ug≥Rg0
pgV̂
g
I (u
b,c, ug).
5.2 Screening contract
Recall that in the screening contract the investor designs a menu of contracts, one for each agent, and his expected
utility is given by
v0
(
(Ψi)i∈{g,b}
)
=
∑
i∈{g,b}
piEP
ki
[ ∫ τ
0
(
I −Ns
)
µds− dDis
]
. (5.8)
In this case, we will have to keep track of the value functions of both banks, when they choose the contract designed
for them, as well as when they do not truthfully reveal their type. We will denote by v0 the maximal utility that the
investor can get out of the screening contract.
v0 := sup
(θg,θb,Dg,Db)∈AScr
pgEP
k?,g(θg,Dg)
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs
]
+ pbEP
k?,b(θb,Db)
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDbs
]
,
where
AScr :=
{
(θg, θb, Dg, Db) ∈ Θ2 ×D2 : U i0(θi, Di) ≥ Ri0, U j0 (θj , Dj) ≥ U j,c0 (θi, Di), (i, j) ∈ {g, b}2, i 6= j
}
.
Different from the study of the shutdown contract, where the investor contracts only the good bank, in order to obtain
the optimal screening contract we need to characterise also the value function of the investor when he contracts the
bad bank. We will therefore follow Section 5.1.1, but by replacing the good bank by the bad bank. Hence, we define
similarly, for any (t, ub, ug,c) ∈ [0,+∞) × Ct the set Âb(t, ug,c, ub). We also introduce the following stochastic control
problem for any (ub, ug,c) ∈ CI
v̂b0 (u
b, ug,c) := sup
Ψb∈Âb(0,ug,c,ub)
pbEP
k?,b(Ψb)
[ ∫ τ
0
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDbs
]
.
The aim of the next sections is to compute the function v̂b0 (ug,c, ub), representing the utility of the investor when hiring
the bad bank. We start by studying it on the boundary of the credible set.
5.2.1 Boundary study
We denote by V L,b(ug,c) the value function of the investor in the lower boundary, when hiring the bad bank, defined
by
V L,bt (u
b) := ess sup
Ψb∈Âb(t,L̂I−Nt (ub),ub)
EP
k?,b(Ψb)
[ ∫ τ
t
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDbs
∣∣∣∣Gt]. (5.9)
The first result is that the value function of the investor on the lower boundary of the credible set is the same when
hiring either the bad or the good bank. This is mainly due to the fact that both banks shirk on the lower boundary.
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Proposition 5.6. For every ub ∈ CI−Nt , we have V L,bt (ub) = V L,gt (ub).
Let us now consider the upper boundary. We denote by V U,b(ub) the value function of the investor on the upper
boundary when hiring the bad agent.
V U,bt (u
b) := ess sup
Ψb∈Âb(t,ÛI−Nt (ub),ub)
EP
k?,b(Ψb)
[ ∫ τ
t
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDbs
∣∣∣∣Gt]. (5.10)
We have the following result.
Proposition 5.7. Under Assumption 2.1, for any t ≥ 0 and any ub ∈ V̂I−Nt , we have that V U,bt (ub) = V̂ U,bI−Nt(ub),
where for any j = 1, · · · , I
V̂ U,bj (u
b) :=

µj
λ̂SHj
+ C˜j
(
ub − Bj
r + λ̂SHj
) λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
, ub < b̂j ,
vbj(u
b), ub ≥ b̂j ,
with vbj given by (E.1) and
C˜j =
(
vbj (̂bj)−
µj
λ̂SHj
)(
b̂j(r + λ̂
0
j )
r + λ̂SHj
) −λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
.
5.2.2 Study of the credible set
We define, for any t ≥ 0 and any (ub, ug,c) ∈ ĈI−Nt , the value function of the investor in the credible set when hiring
the bad bank by
V bt (u
b, ug,c) := ess sup
Ψb∈Âb(t,ug,c,ub)
EP
k?,b(Ψb)
[∫ τ
t
(
µ(I −Ns)ds− dDbs
)∣∣∣∣Gt] . (5.11)
The system of HJB equations associated to this control problem is given by V̂ b0 ≡ 0, and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ I
max

sup
C
j

∂ub V̂
b
j
(
rub −Bkb + (h1,b + (1− θ)h2,b)λ̂kbj
)
+∂ug,c V̂
b
j
(
rug,c −Bkg,c + (h1,g,c + (1− θ)h2,g,c)λ̂kg,cj
)
+
(
V̂ bj−1(u
b − h1,b, ug,c − h1,g,c)− V̂ bj
)
λ̂k
b
j
−V̂ bj−1
(
ub − h1,b, ug,c − h1,g,c)(1− θ)λ̂kbj + µj

, −ρb∂ub V̂ bj − ρg∂ug,c V̂ bj − 1

= 0. (5.12)
With kb = j ·1{h1,b+(1−θ)h2,b<b̂j}, kg,c = j ·1{h1,g,c+(1−θ)h2,g,c<b̂j} and the same set of constraints C
j
as in the system of
HJB equations associated to the functions V̂ gj (u
b,c, ug). The boundary conditions of (5.12) are given, for every ub ∈ V̂j
by
V̂ bj (u
b, Ûj(u
b)) = V̂ U,bj (u
b), V̂ bj (u
b, L̂j(u
b)) = V̂ L,gj (u
b).
Similarly to the shutdown contract, we can argue that the functions V̂ bj are viscosity solutions to the system (5.12),
differentiable almost everywhere and the maximizers in the Hamiltonian define an admissible contract. This implies
the equivalence
v0 = sup
{Rb0∨ub,c≤ub,Rg0∨ug,c≤ug}
v̂g0(u
b,c, ug) + v̂b0 (u
b, ug,c) = sup
{Rb0∨ub,c≤ub,Rg0∨ug,c≤ug}
pgV̂
g
I (u
b,c, ug) + pbV̂
b
I (u
b, ug,c).
5.3 Description of the optimal contracts
In this section we describe the optimal contracts for the investor when he designs a contract for the good or the bad
bank. We explain in detail the optimal contracts on the boundaries of the credible set, which can be obtained explicitly
from the value function of the investor. In the interior of the credible set, we discuss the properties we expect the
optimal contracts to have given the verification results described in the previous sections.
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5.3.1 Optimal contracts on the boundaries of the credible set
We start with the upper boundary of the credible set. The following result is a direct consequence of the proofs of
Proposition 5.5 and 5.7, and the optimal contract for the pure moral hazard case. In the last part of the upper boundary,
in which both agents monitor all the loans, the optimal contract coincides with the one of the subproblem studied in
[50]. Their main results can be found in Appendix E.1.
Proposition 5.8. Under Assumption 2.1, consider for any t ≥ 0 and (ub,Ut(ub)) ∈ Ct the process (ubs)s≥t as the
solution of the following SDE on [t, τ)
dubs =
(
(rubs −Bkb,?s + λk
b,?
s (h
1,b,?
s + (1− θ?s)h2,b,?s )
)
ds− ρbdD?s − h1,b,?s dNs − h2,b,?s dHs, (5.13)
with initial value ub at t, and with
D?s := 1{s=t}
(ub − γbI−Nt)+
ρb
+
∫ s
t
δI−Nr (ubr)dr, θ
?
s := θ
I−Ns(ubs), h
1,b,?
s := h
1,b,I−Ns(ubs), k
b,?
s := k
b,j(ubs),
for s ∈ [t, τ) and j = 1, . . . , I, where γbj is given by (E.2) and
δj(u) := 1{u=γbj}
λ̂0j b̂j + rγ
b
j
ρi
, θj(u) := 1{u∈[̂bj ,̂bj−1+b̂j)}
u− b̂j
b̂j−1
+ 1{u∈[̂bj+b̂j−1,γbj )},
h1,b,j(u) := 1{u∈[c(j,1),̂bj)}u+ 1{u∈[̂bj ,̂bj−1+b̂j)}(u− b̂j−1) + 1{u∈[̂bj+b̂j−1,γbj )}b̂j , k
b,j(u) = j1{θj(u)h1,b,j(u)+(1−θj(u))u<b̂j}.
Then, the contract Ψ? = (D?, θ?, h1,b,?, h2,b,?) is the unique solution of problems (5.3) and (5.10).
Let us comment the optimal contract for the investor on the upper boundary of the credible set. It is the same if he
designs a contract for the good or the bad bank. The state process (ubs)s≥t defined by (5.13) corresponds to the value
function of the bad bank under the optimal contract. The optimal contract offers no payments to the banks when ubs
is smaller than γbI−Ns . In this case the continuation utility of the bad bank is an increasing process and eventually
reaches the value γbI−Ns , if no default happens in the meantime. Payments are postponed until this moment. If the
initial value for the bad agent ub is greater than γbI−Nt , a lump-sum payment is made at t
− in order to have ubt = γbI−Nt .
When ubs = γbI−Ns , the banks receive constant payments which keep the value function of the bad bank constant at this
level. Concerning the liquidation of the project, if, at the default time τ j , it holds that ubτj < b̂j , then the project is
liquidated. In case of ubτj ∈ [̂bj + b̂j−1, γbj ), the project will continue with probability θj ∈ (0, 1) which will be closer
to one as ubτj gets closer to γ
b
j . If ubτj ≥ γbj , the project will be maintained. Finally, the bad bank will monitor all the
loans only when her value function is greater than b̂I−Ns , whereas the good bank will monitor when the value of the
bad bank is greater than x?I−Ns . Figure 2 depicts the optimal contract of the investor on the upper boundary of the
credible set, denoting B̂j := b̂j + b̂j−1.
ubsc(I −Ns, 1) x?I−Ns b̂I−Ns B̂I−Ns γbI−Ns
kgs = I −Ns kgs = 0 kgs = 0 kgs = 0 kgs = 0
kbs = I −Ns kbs = I −Ns kbs = 0 kbs = 0 kbs = 0
θs = 0 θs = 0 θs ∈ (0, 1) θs = 1 θs = 1
dDs = 0 dDs = 0 dDs = 0 dDs = 0 dDs > 0
Figure 2: Optimal contract on the upper boundary.
For the lower boundary of the credible set, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.9. Under Assumption 2.1, consider for any t ≥ 0 and (ub,Lt(ub)) ∈ Ct the process (ubs)s≥t as the
solution of the following SDE on [t, τ)
dubs =
(
(rubs −Bkb,?s + λk
b,?
s (h
1,b,?
s + (1− θ?s)h2,b,?s )
)
ds− ρbdD?s − h1,b,?s dNs − h2,b,?s dHs, (5.14)
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with initial value ub at t, and with
D?s := 1{s=t}
(ub − C(I −Ns))+
ρb
, θ?s := 1{ubs≥C(I−Ns)},
h1,b,?s := u
b
s−C(I−Ns−1)1{ubs≥C(I−Ns)}, h2,b,?s := C(I−Ns−1)1{ubs≥C(I−Ns)}, kb,?s = (I−Ns)1{h1,b,?s +(1−θ?s )h2,b,?s <bs},
for s ∈ [t, τ). Then, the contract Ψ? = (D?, θ?, h1,b,?, h2,b,?) is the unique solution of (5.2) and (5.9).
On the lower boundary of the credible set, the optimal contract for the investor also does not depend on the type of
the bank. If the initial value of the bad bank ub is greater than C(I − Nt), the banks receive a lump-sum payment
such that ubt = C(I −Nt). This is the only payment offered by the contract. If there is a default at some time s such
that ubs < C(I −Ns), the project is liquidated. When ubs = C(I −Ns) the contract maintains the project until the last
default. Since the optimal contract does not provides incentives to the banks to monitor the loans, the good and the
bad bank shirk until the liquidation of the project. Figure 3 depicts the optimal contract of the investor on the lower
boundary of the credible set.
ubsc(I −Ns, 1) C(I −Ns)
kgs = I −Ns kgs = I −Ns
kbs = I −Ns kbs = I −Ns
θs = 0 θs = 1
dDs = 0 dDs > 0
Figure 3: Optimal contract on the lower boundary.
5.3.2 Discussion about the optimal contracts in the interior of the credible set
Figure 4 represents the optimal contracts on the boundaries of the credible set as well as the movements of the values
of the banks along these curves. The green zone corresponds to the region where the contract offers payments to the
agents and the project is maintained if there is a default. The red zone corresponds to the region where there are no
payments and the project is liquidated immediately after a default. Intermediate situations correspond to the yellow
zone. We remark that the banks are paid only on the green zone.
Bj
r+λ̂jj
x?j b̂j C(j)
γj
Bj
r+λ̂jj
b̂j
ρg
ρb
b̂j
C(j)
ug = ub
L̂j(u
b)Û?j (ub)
ub
ug
Figure 4: Optimal contract on the boundaries of the credible set.
Let us now consider the whole credible set and explain how the green and red zones on the boundaries propagate
towards the interior region, given that the optimal contracts for problems (5.4) and (5.11) correspond to the maximisers
in the Hamiltonian of the systems (5.5) and (5.12). Recall that payments only take place when the value function of the
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investor saturates the gradient constraint. Therefore, if at some point of the credible set the banks are paid, this will
also be the case under movements in the direction (ρb, ρg). The interpretation of this property is that the green region,
where the banks are paid and the project is maintained after a default, is formed by the points where the banks have
a good performance and they are rewarded. A movement in the direction (ρb, ρg) correspond to a better performance
of both banks, so it seems unnatural to deprive them of the reward. We can do the opposite interpretation for the red
region, consisting of the points where the banks receive no payments and the project is liquidated after a default. In
consequence, under the optimal contracts, it is possible to identify red and green areas in the credible set, where the
characteristics described in the boundaries will remain, and that will be delimited by some curves similar to those shown
in Figure 5 below. Mathematically, these curves are delimiting the region where the gradient constraint is saturated.
Bj
r+λ̂jj
x?j b̂j C(j)
γj
Bj
r+λ̂jj
b̂j
ρg
ρb
b̂j
C(j)
ug = ub
L̂j(u
b)Û?j (ub)
ub
ug
Figure 5: Optimal contract on the credible set.
5.4 A word on implementability of the contracts
Any real–world application of our model requires to discuss the practical implementability of the contract. Fortunately
for us, the form of the menus of contracts we obtained is completely similar to the one obtained in [50, 51], in the sense
that all rely on a probation zone, where stochastic liquidation may occur, and a zone of good performance, where the
liquidation never occurs. The only difference is of course that in [50, 51] these zones are simply intervals, while they are
more complex regions of the plan in our case, since we have to keep track of both the continuation and the temptation
values of the Agent. Nonetheless, the practical implementation proposed by Pagès [50, Proposition 7] can readily be
adapted to our context. Given the length of the paper, we leave the exact detail to the reader, and simply recall how
the implementation works.
First, a natural way of implementing the contract is to replicate dynamically both the continuation and the temptation
values of the Agent by use of two cash reserve accounts. The accounts should be managed by an independent trust, and
actually serves to both provide protection to the investors, and to manage exactly the performance–based compensation
scheme described in the optimal contract. The current balances reveal outright performance of both type of banks, and
can be used to determine the amount and timing of fees that are released. Then, the implementation basically takes
the form of a whole loan sale with monitoring retained. The reserve accounts then offer protection in the form of ABS
credit default swaps (ABCDS), and serve as instruments to tie the amount and timing of compensation to performance
(meaning that payments are made from the cash reserve only when the continuation and temptation values of the
Agent are in the domain where the gradient constraint is satisfied). The reserve account reveals the level of underlying
performance, which reduces the rent of the monitoring bank and allows it to retain risk at a lower cost than if it were
funded with deposits.
6 Extensions
6.1 Endogenous reservation utility
In a standard Principal–Agent problem, it is assumed that the Agent possesses a minimum level of utility that must be
provided by the Principal in order to make him accept the contract. This reservation value represents the utility that
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the Agent would obtain if the contract offered by the Principal was not sufficiently attractive and he made use of an
outside option (see Condition (2.6) in Section 2.3).
In this section we provide an endogenous characterisation of the reservation utilities of the banks by assuming that if
they do not enter in a contractual relationship with the investor, they can manage the project by themselves. When
the outside option of a bank is to manage the pool of loans on its own, we can find the explicit value of its reservation
utility. Moreover, we outline an extension of our model to the case in which the bank can break the contract at any time
if it can do better by itself. Different from the full-commitment problem studied in the previous sections, the ability of
the bank to break the contract makes the investor offer only the so called renegotiation-proof contracts, which keep the
utility of bank above a dynamic reservation utility until the end of the contract.
If the bank of type ρi manages the project, it receives the cash flows from the loans and does not face the threat of
liquidating the whole pool when one of the loans defaults. Consequently, its reservation utility Ri0 is given by the
following expression
Ri0 = sup
k∈K
EP
k
[ ∫ τI
0
e−rs(ρiµ(I −Ns) +Bks)ds
]
. (6.1)
The value of Ri0 can be obtained as an application of the results from the previous sections, since (6.1) corresponds to
the utility of the bank under a contract with no liquidation at all, θ ≡ 1, and with absolutely continuous payments,
dDt = µ(I −Nt)dt. Its explicit value is provided in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1. Define the recursive sequence of numbers
R̂ij = max
{
ρiµj
r + λ̂0j
− rR̂
i
j−1
r + λ̂0j
,
ρiµj + jB
r + λ̂SHj
− rR̂
i
j−1
r + λ̂SHj
}
, j ∈ {1, . . . , I},
with R̂i0 = 0. The endogenous reservation utility of the bank of type ρi is given by Ri0 = R̂iI . Moreover, the optimal
action in Problem (6.1) is constant in every interval (τ I−j , τ I−j+1) and it is equal to k?,i ≡ 0 if the maximum in the
definition of R̂ij is attained at the first term, and to k?,i ≡ j if the maximum is attained at the last term.
6.2 Renegotiation–proof contracts
Suppose that the bank of type ρi can decide at any time to break the contract with the investors and manage the loans
by itself. By doing so, the bank’s utility at time t would be
Rit := ess sup
k∈K
EP
k
[ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)(ρiµ(I −Ns) +Bks)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Notice that the previous expression depends on t only through the number of loans left at the time. It is straightforward
then that Rit = R̂iI−Nt , for every t ∈ [0, τ I ].
In this setting, a shutdown contract (D, θ) is one which is never broken by the bank of type ρg and is rejected by
the bank of type ρb, who prefers to run the project on its own. That is, U
g
t (D, θ) ≥ Rgt for every t ∈ (0, τ) and
U b0(D, θ) < R
b
0. To find the optimal shutdown contract, we need to characterize first the new credible set which includes
additional state constraints for the good bank. Let us mention immediately that the right of the bank to break the
contract generates differences between the credible sets associated to the shutdown and the screening problem, which
are no longer equal.
Define the renegotiation–proof feasible set for the good bank with j loans left
V˜gj = V̂j ∩ [R̂gj ,∞), j = 1, . . . , I.
Definition 6.1. For any time t ≥ 0, we define the shutdown renegotiation–proof credible set C˜t as the set of (ub, ug) ∈
V̂I−Nt × V˜gI−Nt such that there exists an admissible contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ × D satisfying U bt (θ,D) = ub, U
g
t (θ,D) = u
g
and (U bs (θ,D), Ugs (θ,D)) ∈ V̂I−Ns × V˜gI−Ns for every s ∈ [t, τ), P− a.s.
Given a starting time t ≥ 0 and ub ∈ V̂I−Nt , define the set of contracts which are not broken by the good bank and
under which the value function of the bad bank at time t is equal to ub,
ASH,b(t, ub) = {(θ,D) ∈ Θ×D : U bt (θ,D) = ub, Ugs (θ,D) ≥ Rgs , for every s ∈ [t, τ)}.
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We denote by USHt (ub) the largest value U
g
t (θ,D) that the good bank can obtain from all the contracts (θ,D) ∈
ASH,b(t, ub) and by LSHt (ub) the lowest one. Again, these sets can be proved to depend on t only through the value of
I −Nt so defining UI−Nt(ub) := USHt (ub) and LI−Nt(ub) := LSHt (ub) we finally have
Cj :=
{
(ub, ug) ∈ V̂j × V˜gj : Lj(ub) ≤ ug ≤ Uj(ub)
}
.
As depicted in Figure 4, the upper boundary in the problem with full commitment is absorbing and it generates a
movement of the utilities of the banks in the direction (ρb, ρg). We conclude that the upper boundary in this extension
is the same as before and it is given by
UI−Nt(u
b) = ÛI−Nt(u
b), for every ub such that ÛI−Nt(u
b) ≥ R̂gI−Nt .
On the other hand, since the former lower boundary L̂I−Nt(ub) generates a movement in the direction (−ρb,−ρg), it
cannot be used to obtain LI−Nt(ub) which is the solution to the following control problem
LSHt (u
b) = ess inf
(k,Ψ)∈K×ASH,b(t,ub)
EP
k(Ψ)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρgdDs +Bksds)
∣∣∣∣Gt],
subject to the dynamics, for t ∈ [r, τ ]
U br (Ψg) = u
b +
∫ r
t
(
rubs −Bk?,bs (Ψ) + h1,bs λk
?,b
s + h
2,b
s (1− θs)λk
?,b
s
)
ds− ρb
∫ r
t
dDs −
∫ r
t
h1,bs dNs −
∫ r
t
h2,bs dHs,
with
k?,bs (Ψ) = (I −Ns)1{h1,bs +(1−θs)h2,bs <b̂I−Ns},
and where ASH,b(t, ub) is defined similarly as Ab(t, ub) in Section 4. Once the boundaries are determined and the
credible set is found, a system of recursive HJB equations can be associated to the Principal’s problem, as in the
original problem, and the same kind of study explained in Section 5 follows.
The optimal screening renegotiation–proof problem can be studied analogously, by defining the corresponding credible
set, which is no longer equivalent to the credible set for the shutdown problem but will also keep the upper boundary
from the original problem with full commitment of the banks.
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A Proofs for the pure moral hazard case
We provide in this section all the proofs of the results of Section 3. We start with the
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Using the martingale representation theorem8 (recall that D is supposed to be integrable and that k is
bounded by definition), we deduce that for any k ∈ K there exist G−predictable processes h1,i,k and h2,i,k such that, P− a.s.
duit(k, θ
i, Di) =
(
ruit(k, θ
i, Di)−Bkt
)
dt− ρidDit − h1,i,kt
(
dNt − λkt dt
)− h2,i,kt (dHt − (1− θit)λkt dt), 0 ≤ t < τ, (A.1)
Let us then define
Y i,kt := u
i
t(k, θ
i, Di), Zi,kt := (h
1,i,k
t , h
2,i,k
t )
>, Mt := (Nt, Ht)
>, M˜ it := Mt −
∫ t
0
λ0s(1, 1− θis)>ds, Kit := ρiDit,
so that we can rewrite (A.1) as follows
Y i,kt = 0−
∫ τ
t
f i(s, ks, Y
i,k
s , Z
i,k
s )ds+
∫ τ
t
Zi,ks · dM˜ is +
∫ τ
t
dKis, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, P− a.s.
In other words, (Y i,k, Zi,k) appears as a (super–)solution to a BSDE with (finite) random terminal time, as studied for instance
by Peng [53] or Darling and Pardoux [15]. Notice that by direct computations, it is immediate that it is equivalent to look for a
solution (Y i, Zi) of BSDE (3.2) or to look for solution to the following BSDE
Y˜ it = ξτ −
∫ τ
t
g˜i
(
s, Z˜is
)
ds+
∫ τ
t
Z˜is · dM˜ is, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, P− a.s., (A.2)
where we defined
Y˜ it := e
−rtY it +
∫ t
0
e−rsdKs, Z˜
i
t := e
−rtZit , t ≥ 0, ξτ :=
∫ τ
0
e−rsdKs, g˜
i(s, z) := (I −Ns)
(
αI−Nsεz ·
(
1
1− θis
)
−Be−rs
)−
.
By direct computations, it is easy to see that g˜i satisfies, for any (t, z, z′) ∈ R+ × R2 × R2
g˜i(t, z)− g˜i(t, z′) ≤= γt(z, z′)λ0t (z − z′) · (1, 1− θit)>,
where γt(z, z′) := ε1{(z−z′)·(1,1−θit)>>0}, verifies 0 ≤ γt(z, z
′) ≤ ε. Since in addition g˜i(t, 0) is bounded, (2.3) holds, γt(z, z′) is
bounded and non–negative, the intensity of M˜ i is also bounded, as well as its jumps, we deduce that all the assumptions of
Theorems 3.5 and 3.24 in [52] hold in our setting, proving wellposedness of (3.2) in the space described by (3.3), and that we
can apply a comparison theorem. Therefore, we deduce immediately that for any k ∈ K
Y i,kt ≤ Y it = Y i,k
?,i
t , P− a.s.,
where we defined
k?,it := (I −Nt)1{Zit ·(1,1−θit)><bt}, and bt :=
B
αI−Ntε
, t ≥ 0.
This means that Y i is the value function of the bank, and that her optimal response given (θi, Di) ∈ Θ×D is k?,i.
We finish with the
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First of all, it is clear that the bank of type ρi can get arbitrarily large levels of utility (it suffices for the
investor to set dDis := nds for n large enough, starting from time t). The bank’s maximal level of utility is therefore +∞, which
corresponds to a utility equal to −∞ for the investor. Then, coming back to the definition of the bank’s problem, or to the
BSDE (3.2), it is clear, for instance by using the comparison theorem for super solutions to (3.2) (see [58, Theorem 2.5]), that in
order to minimise the utility that the bank obtains, the investor has to set Di = 0. Moreover, since by definition we must always
have Y it ≥ 0 and Y iτ = 0, and since the totally inaccessible jumps of Y (recall that D is assumed to be predictable) are given by
∆Y it = −Zit ·∆Mt, we must have that
Y it− = Z
i
t · (1, 1)>, and Y it− ≥ Zit · (1, 0)>, t > 0, P− a.s., (A.3)
Indeed, the support of the laws of τ and the τ j under P is [0,+∞). This implies in particular that we must have Zit · (0, 1)> ≥ 0,
which in turn implies that the generator gi is then non–increasing with respect to θi, and thus that the minimal utility for the
8We emphasise that since the filtration G is augmented and generated by point processes, the predictable martingale representation holds
for any of the probability measures (Pk)k∈K, see for instance [18, Lemma A.1].
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bank is attained, as expected, when θi = 0. Then, if (θi, Di) = (0, 0) (which is obviously in Θ × D) starting from time t, it is
clear that the bank will never monitor and will obtain
U it (0, 0) = B(I −Nt)EP
I−N·
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = B(I −Nt)r (1− EPI−N· [e−r(τ−t)∣∣∣Gt])
=
B(I −Nt)
r
(
1−
∫ +∞
0
λI−Ntt e
−xr−xλI−Ntt dx
)
=
B(I −Nt)
r + λI−Ntt
.
Notice that this corresponds to the investor getting
µ(I −Nt)EP
I−N·
[τ − t|Gt] = µ(I −Nt)
λI−Ntt
.
B Short–term contracts with constant payments
In this section we first analyse the optimal responses and the value functions of the banks at a starting time t ≥ 0, under contracts
with constant payments of the form dDs = cds, where c is any Gt−measurable random variable, and with θ ≡ 0, so that the pool
is liquidated immediately after the first default. Then, we extend the study to the case in which the payments are delayed and
they happen only after a certain time t? > t.
B.1 Contracts with no delay
Proposition B.1. For any t ≥ 0, consider the contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ×D such that
θs = 0, dDs = cds, ∀s ≥ t,
where c is any Gt−measurable random variable. For i ∈ {g, b}, define c¯i := bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
ρi
. The optimal effort of the bank of type
ρi and her expected utility under the contract are
• If c ≤ c¯i then k?,is (θ,D) = kSHs , ∀s ∈ [t, τ) and U it (θ,D) = ρic+B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
.
• If c ≥ c¯i then k?,is (θ,D) = 0,∀s ∈ [t, τ) and U it (θ,D) = ρic
r + λ0t
.
Proof. (i) If the bank of type ρi always monitors, we have
uit(0, θ,D) = EP
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ρicds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ρicr + λ0t .
Hence, the continuation utility is constant in time and if the payment c is exactly equal to ui(r + λ0t )/ρi, for some ui ≥ 0, then
the bank receives exactly ui. In this case, the strategy of always monitoring is incentive compatible if and only if ui ≥ bI−Nt .
The minimum payment such that the bank of type ρi will always work is therefore
ci =
bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
ρi
.
(ii) If the bank of type ρi always shirks, her continuation utility is constant and equal to
uit
(
kSH, θ,D
)
= EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρic+B)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ρic+B(I −Nt)r + λkSHt .
Then, if for some ui ≥ 0 one takes c equal to
ui
(
r + λk
SH
t
)−B(I −Nt)
ρi
,
the bank receives ui. Therefore kSH is incentive compatible if and only if ui < bI−Nt . Nevertheless, since the payment c must
be positive, ui must be greater than B(I −Nt)/(r + λkSHt ). The supremum of the payments such that the bank of type ρi will
always shirk is therefore equal to
bI−Nt
(
r + λk
SH
t
)−B(I −Nt)
ρi
=
bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
ρi
= ci.
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B.2 Contracts with delayed payments
Proposition B.2. For any t ≥ 0, consider the contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ×D such that
θs = 0, dDs = c1s≥t?ds, ∀s ≥ t,
where c is any Gt−measurable random variable and t? > t is a fixed constant. For i ∈ {g, b}, define the time
t¯i(c) := t+
1
r + λ0t
log
(
ρic
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
)
.
The optimal effort of the bank of type ρi and her expected utility under the contract are
• If c ≤ c¯i, then k?,is (0, D) = kSHs , ∀s ∈ [t, τ) and U it (0, D) = exp
(
− (r + λkSHt )(t? − t)
) ρic
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
.
• If c > c¯i, t? ≤ t¯i(c), then k?,is (0, D) = 0,∀s ∈ [t, τ) and U it (0, D) = exp
(
− (r + λ0t )(t? − t)
) ρic
r + λ0t
.
• If c > c¯i, t? > t¯i(c), then k?,is (0, D) = kSHs 1{s<t¯i(c)}, ∀s ∈ [t, τ) and
U it (0, D) = exp
(
− (r + λkSHt )(t? − t)
)( ρic
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
) r+λkSHt
r+λ0t bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
.
Proof. (i) If the bank of type ρi always works, at any time t ≤ s < t?, her continuation utility is, noticing that since θ = 0, we
have that (λ0u)u≥t is constant
uis(0, 0, D) = EP
0
[ ∫ τ
t?∧τ
e−r(u−s)ρicdu
∣∣∣∣Gs] = e−(r+λ0t )(t?−s)ρicr + λ0t = uit(0, 0, D)e(r+λ0t )(s−t).
Therefore, at s = t? the continuation utility of the bank is uit?(0, 0, D) = uit(0, 0, D)e(r+λ
0
t )(t
?−t). Next, for any s > t?, the
continuation utility of the bank will be
uis(0, 0, D) = EP
0
[ ∫ τ
s
e−r(u−s)ρicds
∣∣∣∣Gs] = ρicr + λ0t .
Then, we see that once the bank starts being paid, her continuation utility becomes constant and it must be equal to uit?(0, 0, D).
Then, if for some ui ≥ 0, one chooses c equal to
uie(r+λ
0
t )t
?
(r + λ0t )
ρi
, (B.1)
the continuation utility of the bank will be an increasing process with initial value ui. Therefore, 0 is incentive compatible if and
only if ui ≥ bI−Nt . The minimum payment and delay such that the bank always works are t? = 0 and ci = bI−Nt (r+λ
0
t )
ρi
.
(ii) If the bank of type ρi always shirks, at any time t ≤ s < t?, her continuation utility is
uis
(
kSH, 0, D
)
= EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t?∧τ
e−r(u−s)ρicdu+
∫ τ
s
Be−r(u−s)(I −Nt)du
∣∣∣∣Gs] = e−
(
r+λk
SH
t
)
(t?−s)ρic
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
.
Therefore
uis
(
kSH, 0, D
)
= e
(
r+λk
SH
t
)
(s−t)
(
uit(k
SH, 0, D)− B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
)
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,
and the continuation utility is an increasing process. Recall that kSH is incentive compatible if and only if uis
(
kSH, 0, D
)
< bI−Nt
for every s ≥ t. However, if t? is large, there will exist tw such that uitw
(
kSH, 0, D
)
= bI−Nt and the bank will start to work.
More precisely, tw depends on the initial value uit(kSH, 0, D) and is given by
tw := t+
1
r + λk
SH
t
log
(
bI−Nt(r + λ
kSH
t )−B(I −Nt)
uit(k
SH, 0, D)(r + λk
SH
t )−B(I −Nt)
)
.
Notice that tw ≥ t if and only if bI−Nt ≥ uit(kSH, 0, D). Therefore, kSH is incentive compatible if and only if t? < tw. Under this
condition, at t = t? the continuation utility of the bank is
uit?
(
kSH, 0, D
)
= e(r+λ
kSH
t )(t
?−t)
(
uit(k
SH, θ,D)− B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
)
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
< bI−Nt .
Once the bank starts being paid her continuation utility is constant and equal to
uis
(
kSH, 0, D
)
= EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
s
e−r(u−s)(ρic+B(I −Nt))du
∣∣∣∣Gs] = ρic+B(I −Nt)r + λkSHt .
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So if for some ui ≥ 0 the payment c is equal to
e(r+λ
kSH
t )(t
?−t)(ui(r + λkSHt )−B(I −Nt))
ρi
, (B.2)
the expected payoff of the bank at time t is ui. The supremum of the delays and payments such that the bank always shirks are
respectively tw and
e(r+λ
kSH
t )(tw−t)
(
bI−Nt(r + λ
kSH
t )−B(I −Nt)
)
ρi
=
bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
ρi
= ci.
(iii) Finally, consider the case when t? is greater than tw. Under this contract, the bank will shirk until time tw and will work
afterwards. Indeed, from the previous analysis we know that this strategy is incentive compatible. At time tw we have that
uitw (k
SH, 0, D) = bI−Nt and for s ∈ [tw, t?) the continuation utility is given by
uis(0, 0, D) = EP
[ ∫ τ
t?∧τ
e−r(u−s)ρicdu
∣∣∣∣Gs] = e−(r+λ0t )(t?−s)ρicr + λ0t = e(r+λ0t )(s−tw)uitw (kSH, 0, D) = bI−Nte(r+λ0t )(s−tw).
Therefore, at t = t? the continuation utility of the bank is
uit?(0, 0, D) = bI−Nte
(r+λ0t )(t
?−tw),
and for any s > t?, the continuation utility of the bank is constant and equal to
uis(0, 0, D) = EP
[ ∫ τ
s
e−r(u−s)ρicdu
∣∣∣∣Gs] = ρicr + λ0t .
So if for some ui ≥ 0 the payment c is equal to
bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )e
(r+λ0t )(t
?−t)
ρi
(
ui(r + λk
SH
t )−B(I −Nt)
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
) r+λ0t
r+λk
SH
t , (B.3)
the expected payoff of the bank at time t is ui. The minimum payment and delay such that the bank shirks first and works
afterwards are t? = tw and ci =
bI−Nt (r+λ
0
t )
ρi
. Notice that ti(c) in the statement of the Proposition is the corresponding expression
for tw as a function of the payments c.
We conclude this section with the following result, saying that every point in the upper boundary of the credible set can be
attained by short–term contracts with delay.
Proposition B.3. Fix some t ≥ 0. For any point (ub, ug) in the upper boundary of the credible set Ct, there exists a Gt−
measurable payment c, and t? ≥ t such that the contract (θ,D) with θs = 0, dDs = c1s≥t?ds, ∀s ≥ t, is such that Ubt (θ,D) = ub
and Ugt (θ,D) = u
g.
Proof. (i) Let c > c¯b > c¯g and t? ≤ t¯b(c) < t¯g(c). Then k?,b(θ,D) = k?,g(θ,D) = 0 and the values of the banks are
Ugt (θ,D) =
ρgc
r + λ0t
e−(r+λ
0
t )(t
?−t), Ubt (θ,D) =
ρbc
r + λ0t
e−(r+λ
0
t )(t
?−t).
Therefore the utilities satisfy
Ugt (θ,D) =
ρg
ρb
Ubt (θ,D), with U
g
t (θ,D) ∈
[
ρg
ρb
bI−Nt ,∞
)
, Ubt (θ,D) ∈ [bI−Nt ,∞) .
(ii) If c > c¯b and t¯b(c) < t? ≤ t¯g(c), we have that the good bank will always work and the bad bank will start working at time
t¯b(c). Their value functions are
Ugt (θ,D) =
ρgc
r + λ0t
e−(r+λ
0
t )(t
?−t), Ubt (θ,D) = e
−(r+λkSHt )(t?−t)
(
ρbc
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
) r+λkSHt
r+λ0t bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,
so they belong to the curve
Ugt (θ,D) =
ρg
ρb
b
λk
SH
t −λ0t
r+λk
SH
t
I−Nt
(
Ubt (θ,D)− B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
) r+λ0t
r+λk
SH
t
(
r + λk
SH
t
r + λ0t
) r+λ0t
r+λk
SH
t ,
and take values in the sets (recall the definition of x?j in Proposition 4.3)
Ugt (θ,D) ∈
[
bI−Nt ,
ρg
ρb
bI−Nt
)
, Ubt (θ,D) ∈ [x?I−Nt , bI−Nt).
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(iii) If c > c¯b and tg(c) < t?, the good bank will start working at time t¯g(c) and the bad bank will start to work at time t¯b(c).
Their value functions are
Ugt (θ,D) = e
−(r+λkSHt )(t?−t)
(
ρgc
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
) r+λkSHt
r+λ0t bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,
Ubt (θ,D) = e
−(r+λkSHt )(t?−t)
(
ρbc
bI−Nt(r + λ0t )
) r+λkSHt
r+λ0t bI−Nt(r + λ
0
t )
r + λk
SH
t
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,
so they belong to the line
Ugt (θ,D) =
(
ρg
ρb
) r+λkSHt
r+λ0t
(
Ubt (θ,D)− B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
)
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
,
with
Ugt (θ,D) ∈
[
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
, bI−Nt
)
, Ubt (θ,D) ∈
[
B(I −Nt)
r + λk
SH
t
, x?I−Nt
)
.
B.3 Initial lump–sum payment
Take any point (ub, ug) in the credible set at time t. We know that there exists an admissible contract (θ,D), such that
Ubt (θ,D) = u
b and Ugt (θ,D) = u
g. Consider the payments D` which differ from D only at time t, where a lump-sum payment of
size ` > 0 is made. This added lump-sum payment will not change the banks’ incentives and the new value functions at time t
will be
Ugt (θ,D
`) = ug + ρg`, U
b
t (θ,D
`) = ub + ρb`.
Hence, the new pair of values of the banks belong to the line with slope ρg
ρb
which passes through the point (ub, ug). Since in our
setting there is no upper bound on the payment, by increasing the value of ` it is possible to reach every point of the ray which
starts at (ub, ug) and goes in the positive direction.
B.4 Credible region under contracts with delay
From the previous subsection we know that for every point (ub, ug) on the upper boundary there exists a pair (c, t?), with c > c¯b,
such that under the contract (θ ≡ 0, dDs = c1{s≥t?}ds) we have Ubt (θ,D) = ub and Ugt (θ,D) = ug. As explained in Section B.3,
if we consider the contract (θ,D`) with an additional initial lump–sum payment, the incentives of the banks will not change and
the new value functions of the agents will be Ubt (θ,D`) = ub + ρb`, U
g
t (θ,D) = u
g + ρg`. Therefore under short–term contracts
with delay which reach the upper boundary and lump–sum payments, all the subregion of the credible set delimited by the lines
shown in Figure 6 can be reached. We will not enter into details but it can be proved that under all the short–term contracts
with delay (not only the ones who reach the upper boundary) and lump-sum payments, the subregion of the credible set which
can be reached is exactly the same. When there is only one loan left, this region is equal to the whole credible set but when
j > 1 the credible set is strictly bigger due to the pair of utilities that can be achieved in situations when θ 6≡ 0.
ub
ug ug = ub
L
Û?j (ub)
B
r+λ̂SHj
B
r+λ̂SHj
bj
ρg
ρb
bj
x?j bj
L : ug =
ρg
ρb
ub + B
r+λ̂SHj
(
1− ρgρb
)
.
Figure 6: Credible region under short-term contracts with delay and lump-sum payment.
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C Technical results for the lower boundary
We begin this section with the
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Observe first that we have
EP
kSH [
e−r(τ
Nt+1−t)∣∣Gt] = ∫ ∞
0
e−rxλ̂SHI−Nte
−λ̂SHI−Ntxdx =
λ̂SHI−Nt
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
,
and for any ` ∈ {Nt + 1, . . . , I − 1}
EP
kSH [
e−r(τ
`+1−τ`)∣∣Gt] = ∫ ∞
0
e−rxλ̂SHI−`e
−λ̂SHI−`xdx =
λ̂SHI−`
r + λ̂SHI−`
.
Thus, the utility that the bank gets from shirking (without considering the payments in the contract) is
ut(k
SH, θ, 0) = EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
= EP
kSH
[ ∫ τNt+1
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Nt)ds+
Nt+m−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ τi+1
τi
e−r(s−t)B(I − i)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
=
B(I −Nt)
r
EP
kSH [
1− e−r(τNt+1−t)∣∣Gt]+ Nt+m−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r
EP
kSH [
e−r(τ
i−t) − e−r(τi+1−t)∣∣Gt]
=
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
Nt+m−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r
EP
kSH
[(
1− e−r(τi+1−τi)) i−1∏
`=Nt
e−r(τ
`+1−τ`)
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Therefore, by independence we have
ut(k
SH, θ, 0) =
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
Nt+m−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
i−1∏
`=Nt
λ̂SHI−`
r + λ̂SHI−`
=
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−Nt−1∑
i=I−Nt−m+1
Bi
r + λ̂SHi
I−Nt∏
`=i+1
λ̂SH`
r + λ̂SH`
.
We proceed with the
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The value functions of the banks under Ψ := (θ,D) are given by
Ugt (Ψ) = E
Pk
?,g(Ψ)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρgdDs +Bk
?,g
s (Ψ)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt], Ubt (Ψ) = EPk?,b(Ψ)[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρbdDs +Bk
?,b
s (Ψ)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Thus, we first have, P−a.s.
Ugt (Ψ) ≥ EP
k?,b(Ψ)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρgdDs +Bk
?,b
s (Ψ)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt] ≥ EPk?,b(Ψ)[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρbdD
g
s +Bk
?,b
s (Ψ)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt] = Ubt (Ψ).
But we also have
Ugt (Ψ) ≥ EP
k?,b(Ψ)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρgdDs +Bk
?,b
s (Ψ)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt] = Ubt (Ψ) + (ρg − ρb)EPk?,b(Ψ)[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)dDs
∣∣∣∣Gt]
=
ρg
ρb
Ubt (Ψ)− (ρg − ρb)
ρb
EP
k?,b(Ψ)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)Bk?,bs (Ψ)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Observe next that
sup
k∈K
EP
k
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(t−s)Bksds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = EPkSH [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(t−s)BkSHs ds
∣∣∣∣Gt],
because the left–hand side is the value function of a bank who is offered a contract with no payments. Therefore, we have that
Ugt (Ψ) ≥
ρg
ρb
Ubt (Ψ)− (ρg − ρb)
ρb
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)BkSHs ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] ≥ ρgρb Ubt (Ψ)− (ρg − ρb)ρb C(I −Nt),
because the utility that the banks get from shirking is non–decreasing with respect to the process θ and its maximum value is
equal to C(I −Nt), attained when θ ≡ 1 (see (4.2)).
We continue this section with the
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. Thanks to Lemma 4.1, it suffices to prove the existence of contracts under which the value functions
of the banks satisfy the equalities.
• Step 1: First, fix some t ≥ 0, take any ub ∈ [c(I −Nt, 1), C(I −Nt)] and fix m ∈ {1, . . . , I − Nt − 1} such that
c(I−Nt,m) ≤ ub ≤ c(I−Nt,m+1). Next, take θ0t (ub) ∈ [0, 1] such that ub = c(I−Nt,m)+θ0t (ub)(c(I−Nt,m+1)−c(I−Nt,m)).
Then, there is a contract (θ,D) ∈ Θ×D such that Ugt (θ,D) = Ubt (θ,D) = ub. Such a contract can be defined as follows
dDs := 0, θs := 1{t≤s≤τNt+m} + (1− θ
0
t (u
b))1{τNt+m<s≤τNt+m+1}, for every s ≥ t.
The contract has no payments, it always maintains the pool after the first m defaults, maintains the pool with probability θ0
after default m+ 1, and liquidates the pool at default m+ 2. It is clear that under this contract both banks always shirk in [t, τ ],
since they are not paid, and their value functions satisfy
Ugt (θ,D) = U
b
t (θ,D) = EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)BkSHs ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = c(I −Nt,m) + θ0t (ub)(c(I −Nt,m+ 1)− c(I −Nt,m)) = ub.
• Step 2: Fix again some t ≥ 0, and choose now any ub ≥ C(I − Nt) and define ug := ρgρb u
b − (ρg−ρb)
ρb
C(I − Nt). Let
`t := (u
b − C(I −Nt))/ρb and consider the admissible contract satisfying, θs = 1, dDs = `t1{s=t}, for every s ≥ t. The optimal
strategy for both banks under this contract is to always shirk and then
Ubt (θ,D) = EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
ρbdDs +Bk
SH
s ds
)∣∣∣∣Gt] = ρb`t + C(I −Nt) = ub,
Ugt (θ,D) = E
Pk
SH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
ρgdDs +Bk
SH
s ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ρg`t + C(I −Nt) = ug.
We conclude this section by proving some useful results that will be used in Section 5.1.1 in the study of the value function of the
investor on the lower boundary. We show that there are several ways of reaching the lower boundary and that all the contracts
which can achieve it have the same structure as the ones used in the proof of Proposition 4.2.
Lemma C.1. Consider any (t, ub, ug) ∈ [0, τ ]× V̂I−Nt ×V̂I−Nt such that in addition ub = ug. Any contract Ψ = (θ,D) ∈ Θ×D
such that Ubt (Ψ) = ub and U
g
t (Ψ) = u
g, has no payments on [t, τ ] and consequently both banks always shirk under Ψ.
Proof. Looking at the proof of (4.3) we deduce that necessarily k?,gs (Ψ) = k?,bs (Ψ), dDs = 0, ∀s ≥ t. Since there are no payments,
we have that k?,gs (Ψ) = k?,bs (Ψ) = kSHs for s ∈ [t, τ ] and indeed have
Ugt (Ψ) = U
b
t (Ψ) = EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Lemma C.2. Consider any (t, ug, ub) ∈ R+ × V̂I−Nt × V̂I−Nt such that in addition
ug =
ρg
ρb
ub − (ρg − ρb)
ρb
C(I −Nt).
Under any contract Ψ = (θ,D) ∈ Θ ×D such that Ubt (Ψ) = ub and Ugt (Ψ) = ug, the pool is not liquidated until the last default
(τ = τ I) and both banks always shirk on [t, τ ].
Proof. Looking at the proof of (4.4), we deduce that necessarily k?,gs (Ψ) = k?,bs (Ψ) = kSHs , θs = 1, for every s ≥ t. Thus, the
value functions of the banks are given by
Ugt (Ψ) = ρgE
Pk
SH
[ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)dDs
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ C(I −Nt), Ubt (Ψ) = ρbEPkSH [ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)dDs
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ C(I −Nt).
D Technical results for the upper boundary
Lemma D.1. For every j ≥ 1, x?j > ρbρg b̂j.
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Proof. For any j ≥ 1, define the functions g, h : R −→ R by
g(x) := x
r+λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j b̂j
r + λ̂0j
r + λ̂SHj
+
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
, h(x) := b̂jx.
Then g is strictly convex in R+ and we have that g(1) = h(1) = b̂j and g′(1) = h′(1) = b̂j . Thus, h is the tangent line to g at
x = 1 so g(x) > h(x) for every x 6= 1 and therefore
x?j = g
(
ρb
ρg
)
> h
(
ρb
ρg
)
=
ρb
ρg
b̂j .
Proposition D.1. For every j ≥ 1, the function Û?j defined by (4.17) satisfies
Û?j (x)
x
≤ ρg
ρb
, ∀x ≥ Bj
r + λ̂SHj
.
Moreover, equality holds if and only if x ≥ b̂j.
Proof. Define A(x) :=
Û?j (x)
x
. If x ≥ b̂j−1 then A(x) = ρg/ρb. If now x ∈ [x?j , b̂j), we have
A(x) =
ρg
ρb
(̂bj)
λ̂SHj −λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
(
r + λ̂SHj
r + λ̂0j
) r+λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j 1
x
(
x− Bj
r + λ̂SHj
) r+λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j .
This function is decreasing so that A reaches its maximum value over [x?j , b̂j) at x?j . Next, we have
A(x?j ) =
b̂j
x?j
<
ρg
ρb
⇐⇒ x?j > ρb
ρg
b̂j ,
and the last inequality holds as a consequence of Lemma D.1. Finally, if x ∈ [ Bj
r+λ̂SHj
, x?j
)
then
A(x) =
1
x
(
ρg
ρb
) r+λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j
(
x− Bj
r + λ̂SHj
)
+
1
x
Bj
r + λ̂SHj
.
This function is increasing, hence A(x) ≤ A(x?j ) < ρgρb , ∀x ∈
[
Bj
r+λ̂SHj
, x?j
]
.
Corollary D.1. Let j ≥ 2 and Û?j , Û?j−1 defined by (4.17), and assume that λ̂k
g
j ≤ λ̂k
b
j . Then, for any ub ≥ h1,b + B(j−1)r+λ̂SHj−1 we
have
Û?j−1(ub − h1,b)λ̂k
g
j −
(Û?j )′(ub)λ̂kbj (ub − h1,b) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, equality holds if and only if ub − h1,b ≥ b̂j, ub ≥ b̂j and λ̂kbj = λ̂k
g
j .
Proof. Under the conditions of the corollary, the following allows us to conclude immediately
Û?j−1(ub − h1,b)
ub − h1,b ≤
ρg
ρb
≤ (Û?j )′(ub).
Corollary D.2. For j ≥ 1, let Ĉj and Û?j be defined by (4.16) and (4.17) respectively. If (θ, h1,b) ∈ Ĉj is such that ub − θ(ub −
h1,b) ≥ b̂j then Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1,b) ≥ b̂j. As a consequence, in the context of equation (4.15), for every (θ, h1,b) ∈ Ĉj we
have kg ≤ kb and λ̂kgj ≤ λ̂k
b
j .
Proof. First observe that ub − θ(ub − h1,b) ≥ b̂j implies ub ≥ b̂j . Then we have
Û?j (ub)− b̂j ≥ ρg
ρb
(ub − b̂j) ≥ Û
?
j−1(u
b − h1,b)
ub − h1,b (u
b − b̂j).
Also, θ ≤ u
b − b̂j
ub − h1,b and thus
Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1,b) ≥ Û?j (ub)−
(
ub − b̂j
ub − h1,b
)
Û?j−1(ub − h1,b) ≥ b̂j .
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We now proceed with the
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We start with the region ub < b̂1, Û1(ub) < b̂1. For these points, we have that kb = kg = 1, so (4.11) can
be solved easily and leads to, for some C1 ∈ R
Û1(ub) = C1
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
.
If ub < b̂1 and Û1(ub) ≥ b̂1, then kb = 1, kg = 0 and we can solve (4.11) to obtain for some C2 ∈ R
Û1(ub) = C2
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11 .
Finally, when ub ≥ b̂1 and Û(ub) ≥ b̂1 the optimal strategies are kb = kg = 0 and we have for some C3 ∈ R, Û1(ub) = C3ub. We
are interested in smooth solutions of (4.11). Denote by Û (1)1 , Û (2)1 and Û (3)1 the following functions
Û (1)1 (ub) := C1
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ11
, Û (2)1 (ub) := C2
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11 , Û (3)1 (ub) := C3ub.
We will determine the relations between the constants which allow the smooth fitting of Û1. First we impose Û (2)1 (̂b1) = Û (3)1 (̂b1)
and we get
C2
(
b̂1
r + λ̂01
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11 = C3b̂1.
It can be checked that this relation between C1 and C2 ensures also that (Û (2)1 )′(̂b1) = (Û (3)1 )′(̂b1). Next, define x1 as the point
such that Û (1)1 (x1) = b̂1, i.e.
x1 =
b̂1
C1
(
r + λ̂01
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
.
Also, define x2 as the point such that Û (2)1 (x2) = b̂1, i.e.
x2 =
(
b̂1
C2
) r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01 +
B
r + λ̂11
.
We impose x1 = x2 and we get
b̂1
C1
(
r + λ̂01
r + λ̂11
)
=
(
b̂1
C2
) r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01 ,
and this relation ensures also that (Û (1)1 )′(x1) = (Û (2)1 )′(x2). Expressing both C1 and C2 in terms of C3 we get Û (3)1 (ub) = C3ub,
and
Û (1)1 (ub) = C3
r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
, Û (2)1 (ub) = C3b̂
λ̂11−λ̂01
r+λ̂11
1
(
r + λ̂11
r + λ̂01
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11 .
We pursue with the
Proof of Lemma 4.3. For C0 > 0, define the following modification ÛC0,?1 of ÛC01
ÛC0,?1 (ub) :=
Û
C0
1 (u
b), ub ≤ xC0,?1 ,
ρg
ρb
(ub − xC0,?1 ) + ÛC01 (xC0,?1 ), ub ≥ xC0,?1 ,
where
xC0,?1 := inf
{
ub ∈
[
B
r + λ̂11
,+∞
)
:
(ÛC01 )′(ub) ≤ ρgρb
}
.
The function ÛC0,?1 is continuously differentiable, solves the diffusion equation in [B/(r+λ̂11), xC0,?1 ) and satisfies
(ÛC0,?1 )′ = ρg/ρb
in (xC0,?1 ,∞). In the following we will study for which values of C0 this function indeed solves the HJB equation.
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− First of all, if C
r+λ̂11
r+λ̂01
0 ≤ ρgρb , we have that
xC0,?1 =
B
r + λ̂11
, ÛC0,?1 (ub) =
ρg
ρb
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
,
(
ÛC0,?1
)′
(ub)ρb − ρg = 0,
so that we need to check that for every ub in [B/(r + λ̂11),∞)
rÛC0,?1 (ub)−
(ÛC,?1 )′(ub)(rub −Bkb + ubλ̂kb1 )+ ÛC,?1 (ub)λ̂kg1 −Bkg ≥ 0.
Take ub > b̂1. Then kg = kb = 0, and we have
rÛC0,?1 (ub)−
(ÛC0,?1 )′(ub)(rub −Bkb + ubλ̂kb1 )+ ÛC0,?1 (ub)λ̂kg1 −Bkg
= r
(
ρg
ρb
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
)
− ρg
ρb
(
(r + λ̂01)u
b)+ λ̂01(ρg
ρb
(
ub − B
r + λ̂11
)
+
B
r + λ̂11
)
= (r + λ̂01)
B
r + λ̂11
(
1− ρg
ρb
)
< 0.
Hence ÛC0,?1 is not a solution of (4.12).
− If
(
ρg
ρb
) r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11 < C0 ≤ ρgρb , then x
C0,?
1 = b̂1
r+λ̂01
r+λ̂11
(
C0ρb/ρg
) r+λ̂11
λ̂11−λ̂01 + B
r+λ̂11
. Take ub > b̂1, then kg = kb = 0 and
rÛC,?1 (ub)−
(ÛC0,?1 )′(ub)(rub −Bkb + ubλ̂kb1 )+ ÛC,?1 (ub)λ̂kg1 −Bkg = (r + λ̂01)(b̂1C r+λ̂11λ̂11−λ̂01 ( ρbρg
) r+λ̂01
λ̂11−λ̂01 λ̂
1
1 − λ̂01
r + λ̂11
− ρg
ρb
B
r + λ̂11
)
≤ (r + λ̂01)
(
b̂1
ρg
ρb
λ̂11 − λ̂01
r + λ̂11
− B
r + λ̂11
ρg
ρb
)
= 0.
The inequality is strict if C0 <
ρg
ρb
so the only value of C0 such that ÛC0,?1 solves the HJB equation is C0 = ρgρb .
− For large values of C0, i.e. C0 > ρgρb , we have that x
C0,?
1 = +∞ and then ÛC0,?1 = ÛC01 . We exclude this case because
these functions do not satisfy condition (4.13).
We end this section with the
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The proof is by induction. For j = 1 the result is proved in Step 2, so we take any j > 1 and assume
that Û?j−1 solves its corresponding diffusion equation. We will need to consider three different cases to prove that Û?j solves the
equation (4.15). In each one of them we prove that the supremum in the right–hand side of (4.15) is attained with θ = 0, so that
the diffusion equation takes the same form as the one in the case with one loan left. Then, it follows from the analysis in Step 2
that its solution satisfies also the variational inequality (4.9).
− Case 1: ub < b̂j , Û?j (ub) < b̂j .
In this case for any (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj , we have that kg = kb = j. To ease notations, define cj(ub) :=
(Û?j )′(ub)(rub − Bj + ubλ̂SHj ).
Then the term inside the supremum in (4.15) becomes
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj + θλ̂SHj
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)− (Û?j )′(ub)(ub − h1)),
and the optimal choice of θ in this case is 0 (uniquely) because thanks to Corollary D.1 we have
Û?j−1(ub − h1)−
(Û?j )′(ub)(ub − h1) < 0.
− Case 2: ub < b̂j , Û?j (ub) ≥ b̂j .
In this case kb = j for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj . The term inside the supremum in (4.15) becomes
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂k
g
j +Bk
g + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂kgj − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1)).
Define the following sets
Ĉ0j :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj : Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1) ≥ b̂j
}
, Ĉjj :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj : Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1) < b̂j
}
,
and note that kg = 0 for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉ0j and kg = j for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉjj . Also, the pair (0, h1) belongs to Ĉ0j for every
feasible h1.
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• If (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉ0j we have
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂k
g
j +Bk
g + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂kgj − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1))
= cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂0j − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1)) ≤ cj(ub)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j ,
where the inequality is due to Corollary D.1.
• If (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉjj we have
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂k
g
j +Bk
g + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂kgj − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1))
= cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂SHj − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1))
< cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj
= cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj + b̂j(λ̂SHj − λ̂0j ) ≤ cj(ub)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj + Û?j (ub)
(
λ̂SHj − λ̂0j
)
= cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j ,
where the first inequality is a consequence of Corollary D.1 and the second one holds because Û?j (ub) ≥ b̂j . So we conclude that
the optimal value for θ in this case is also 0 (uniquely).
− Case 3: ub ≥ b̂j , Û?j (ub) ≥ b̂j .
Thanks to Proposition D.2 , we know that there are only three possibilities for the value of (kb, kg). Define the sets
Ĉ0,0j :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj : ub − θ(ub − h1) ≥ b̂j , Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1) ≥ b̂j
}
,
Ĉj,0j :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj : ub − θ(ub − h1) < b̂j , Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1) ≥ b̂j
}
,
Ĉj,jj :=
{
(θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj : ub − θ(ub − h1) < b̂j , Û?j (ub)− θÛ?j−1(ub − h1) < b̂j
}
.
Then, (kb, kg) = (0, 0) for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉ0,0j , (kb, kg) = (j, 0) for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj,0j and (kb, kg) = (j, j) for every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj,jj .
Also, (0, h1) belongs to Ĉ0,0j for any feasible h
1.
• If (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉ0,0j then the term inside the supremum in (4.15) is, because of Corollary D.1, equal to(Û?j )′(ub)ub(r + λ̂0j)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j + θλ̂0j(Û?j−1(ub − h1)− (Û?j )′(ub)(ub − h1)) ≤ (Û?j )′(ub)ub(r + λ̂0j)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j ,
• If (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj,0j , then h1 < b̂j and u
b−b̂j
ub−h1 < θ ≤
Û?j (ub)−b̂j
Û?j−1(ub−h1)
. The term in the supremum in (4.15) is
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j + θ
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂0j − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1))
< cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j +
(
ub − b̂j
ub − h1
)(Û?j−1(ub − h1)λ̂0j − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj (ub − h1))
≤ cj(ub)− Û?j (ub)λ0j + (ub − b̂j)
((Û?j )′(ub)λ̂0j − (Û?j )′(ub)λ̂SHj ) = (Û?j )′(ub)(rub + ubλ̂0j)− Û?j (ub)λ̂0j .
Both inequalities are direct consequences of Corollary D.1.
• Finally, if (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉj,jj , note that h1 < b̂j , Û?j (ub)− Û?j−1(ub − h1) < b̂j and
ub − b̂j
ub − h1 ≤
Û?j (ub)− b̂j
Û?j−1(ub − h1)
< θ.
Then, the term inside the sup in (4.15) becomes
cj(u
b)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj + θλ̂SHj
(Û?j−1(ub − h1)− (Û?j )′(ub)(ub − h1))
≤ cj(ub)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj +
Û?j (ub)− b̂j
Û?j−1(ub − h1)
λ̂SHj
(
Û?j−1(ub − h1)−
(Û?j )′(ub)(ub − h1))
≤ cj(ub)− Û?j (ub)λ̂SHj +Bj + λ̂SHj
(
Û?j (ub)− b̂j −
(Û?j )′(ub) Û?j (ub)− b̂jρg
ρb
)
= cj(u
b)− b̂j λ̂0j + λ̂SHj
(
− ρb
ρg
(Û?j )′(ub)Û?j (ub) + ρb
ρg
(Û?j )′(ub)̂bj)
= λ̂SHj
(Û?j )′(ub)(ub − ρb
ρg
Û?j (ub)
)
+
(Û?j )′(ub)(rub + ρb
ρg
λ̂SHj b̂j −Bj
)
− λ̂0j b̂j .
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The first inequality comes from Corollary D.1 and the second one from the fact that the map h1 7−→ Û?j−1(ub − h1)/(ub − h1) is
non–decreasing and constant for large values of h1, which implies that Û?j−1(ub−h1)/(ub−h1) ≤ ρg/ρb. Now we use the explicit
form of Û?j and compute
λ̂SHj
(Û?j )′(ub)(ub − ρb
ρg
Û?j (ub)
)
+
(Û?j )′(ub)(rub + ρb
ρg
λ̂SHj b̂j −Bj
)
− λ̂0j b̂j
=
ρg
ρb
rub + λ̂SHj b̂j − ρg
ρb
Bj − λ̂0j b̂j = ρg
ρb
rub +Bj
(
1− ρg
ρb
)
<
ρg
ρb
rub.
The term in the last line corresponds to
(Û?j )′(ub)(rub + ubλ̂0j) − Û?j (ub)λ̂0j and therefore the optimal θ in this case is also 0.
Observe that in this case every (θ, h1) ∈ Ĉ0,0j such that ub − h1 ≥ b̂j is optimal.
We next continue with the
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We divide the proof in 3 steps.
• Step 1: Let us prove first that the SDE (4.19) has a unique solution, keeping in mind that Ψ? liquidates the pool
immediately after the first default. We consider two cases: if ub < b̂I−Nt , by right–continuity we can find for every solution of
(4.19) some ε ∈ (0, τ − t) such that ubs < b̂I−Nt for s ∈ [t, t+ ε]. Consequently ub solves the ODE
dubs =
(
(r + λ̂SHI−Nt)u
b
s −B(I −Nt)
)
ds, s ∈ [t, t+ ε],
whose unique solution is given by
ubs = e
(r+λ̂SHI−Nt )(s−t)
(
ub − B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
)
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
, s ∈ [t, t+ ε].
So, as long as there is no default and the project keeps running ubs will be deterministic until it reaches the value b̂I−Nt . That
will eventually happen at time
t?(ub) := t+
1
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
log
(
b̂I−Nt(r + λ̂
0
I−Nt)
ub(r + λ̂SHI−Nt)−B(I −Nt)
)
,
and we see from (4.19) that at time t?(ub) we will have dubs = 0, so ubs = b̂I−Nt for every s ∈ [t?(ub), τ). In the second case,
if ub ≥ b̂I−Nt then (4.19) becomes dubs = −ubs−dNs, s ∈ [t, τ ], and necessarily ubs = ub for every s ∈ [t, τ). This proves the
existence and uniqueness of the solution of (4.19) in both cases. It is then immediate that the first integrability condition in
(3.3) is satisfied.
• Step 2: Now we turn to the values of the banks under Ψ?. If ub ≥ b̂I−Nt , we know from the previous analysis that
ubs = u
b ≥ b̂I−Nt for every s ∈ [t, τ), so in this case Ψ? is a short–term contract with constant payment, see Section B.1. Using the
notations of that section, since the payment c =
ub(r+λ̂0j )
ρb
is such that c ≥ c¯b ≥ c¯g both banks will always work, the value function of
the bad bank is Ubt (Ψ?) = ρbc/(r+λ̂0I−Nt) = u
b and the one of the good bank is Ugt (Ψ
?) = ρgc/(r+λ̂
0
I−Nt) = ρg/ρbu
b = Û?I−Nt(ub).
In the case where ub < b̂I−Nt , Ψ
? is a short–term contract with delay t?(ub) and constant payment, see Section B.2. Using the
notations of that section, since c = c¯b the bad bank will always shirk and her value function is
Ubt (Ψ
?) = ρbc
e−(r+λ̂
SH
I−Nt )t
?(ub)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
B
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
= ub.
For the good bank we have two sub–cases. First, if ub ∈ [x?I−Nt , b̂I−Nt) then t¯g(c) ≥ t?(ub), so the good bank will always work
and her value function is
Ugt (Ψ
?) =
ρg
ρb
b̂
λ̂SHI−Nt−λ̂
0
I−Nt
r+λ̂SH
I−Nt
I−Nt
(
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
r + λ̂0I−Nt
) r+λ̂0I−Nt
r+λ̂SH
I−Nt
(
ub − B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
) r+λ̂0I−Nt
r+λ̂SH
I−Nt = Û?I−Nt(ub).
If ub ∈ [ B
r+λ̂SH
I−Nt
, x?I−Nt
)
then t¯g(c) < t?(ub), so the good bank will start working at time t?(ub) and her value function is
Ugt (Ψ
?) =
ρg
ρb
r+λ̂SHI−Nt
r+λ̂0
I−Nt
(
ub − B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
)
+
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
= Û?I−Nt(ub).
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• Step 3: Since Ubt (Ψ?) = ub, we have Ψ? ∈ Ab(t, ub). Consider now a contract Ψ = (D, θ, h1,b, h2,b) ∈ Ab(t, ub). We
recall that the value function of the bad bank under Ψ satisfies
dUbs (Ψ) =
(
rUbs (Ψ)−Bk?,bs (Ψ) +
(
h1,bs + h
2,b
s (1− θs)
)
λk
?,b(Ψ)
s
)
ds− ρbdDs − h1,bs dNs − h2,bs dHs,
with k?,bs (Ψ) = 1{h1,bs +(1−θs)h2,bs <bs}. Define the process
Gw :=
∫ w
t
e−r(s−t)
(
ρgdDs + k
?,g
s (Ψ)Bds
)
+ e−r(w−t)Û?I−Nw (Ubw(Ψ)), w ∈ [t, τ ].
Observe we can rewrite the second term in the following form (with the convention τNt = t, τNw+1 = w)
e−r(w−t)Û?I−Nw (Ubw(Ψ)) =
Nw∑
i=Nt
e−r(τ
i+1−t)Û?I−i
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)
)
− e−r(τi−t)Û?I−i
(
Ubτi(Ψ)
)
+
Nw−1∑
i=Nt
e−r(τ
i+1−t)
(
Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ubτi+1(Ψ)
)
− Û?I−i
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)
))
+ Û?I−Nt
(
Ubt (Ψ)
)
.
Since the functions Û?j are C1, we can apply Itô’s formula on the intervals [τ i ∧ τ, τ i+1 ∧ τ) with i ∈ {Nt, . . . , Nw} to obtain an
integral expression for the first sum. Regarding the second sum, observe that
Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ubτi+1(Ψ)
)
− Û?I−i
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)
)
=
(
Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)− h1,bτi+1
)
− Û?I−i
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)
))
∆Nτi+1 − Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ub(τi+1)−(Ψ)− h1,bτi+1
)
∆Hτi+1
=
∫ τi+1
τi
(
Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)
− Û?I−i
(
Ubs−(Ψ)
))
dNs −
∫ τi+1
τi
Û?I−(i+1)
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)
dHs.
Hence
Gτ∧v = Û?I−Nt(ub) +
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)
(
ρg − ρb
(Û?I−i)′(Ubs (Ψ)))dDs + I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)
(
k?,gs (Ψ)B − rÛ?I−i
(
Ubs (Ψ)
))
ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)λk
?,g(Ψ)
s
(
θsÛ?I−i−1
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)− Û?I−i(Ubs (Ψ)))ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)Û?′I−i
(
Ubs (Ψ)
)(
rUbs (Ψ)−Bk?,bs (Ψ) + λk
?,b(Ψ)
s (h
1,b
s + (1− θs)h2,bs )
)
ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)
(
Û?I−i−1
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)− Û?I−i(Ubs−(Ψ)))(dNs − λk?,g(Ψ)s ds)
−
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)Û?I−i−1
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)(
dHs − λk
?,g(Ψ)
s (1− θs)ds
)
.
We know that the derivative of every Û?j is greater than ρg/ρb by definition, and since D is non–decreasing, the first sum
of integrals is non–positive. Also, the functions Û?j are solutions of the system of HJB equations, which implies that for any
admissible contract the second and the third sum of integrals are also non–positive. We deduce
Gτ∧v ≤ Û?I−Nt(ub) +
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
er(t−s)
(
Û?I−i−1
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)− Û?I−i(Ubs−(Ψ)))(dNs − λk?,gs ds)
−
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
e−r(s−t)Û?I−i−1
(
Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs
)(
dHs − λk
?,g(Ψ)
s (1− θs)ds
)
. (D.1)
Define λ := max1≤j≤I λ̂SHj . For every i we have that, recalling that the functions Û?j are non–decreasing and null at 0
EP
k?,g
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
∣∣∣Û?I−i−1(Ubs (Ψ)− h1,bs )∣∣∣ds∣∣∣∣Gt] ≤ EPk?,g [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
ρg
ρb
ube(r+λ)sds
∣∣∣∣Gt],
which is finite. Indeed, we have between two consecutive jump times of N
dUbs (Ψ) =
(
rUbs (Ψ)−Bk?,bs (Ψ) + (h1,bs + (Ubs (Ψ)− h1,bs )(1− θs))λk
?,b(Ψ)
s
)
ds− ρbdDs
≤
(
rUbs (Ψ) + h
1,b
s λ
k?,b(Ψ)
s + (U
b
s (Ψ)− h1,bs )(1− θs)λk
?,b(Ψ)
s
)
ds
= Ubs (Ψ)
(
r + (1− θs)λk
?,b(Ψ)
s
)
ds+ h1,bs θsλ
k?,b(Ψ)
s ds ≤ Ubs (Ψ)
(
r + λk
?,b(Ψ)
s
)
ds,
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where we used the facts that h1,bs ∈ [0, Ubs (Ψ)], the functions Û?j are non–decreasing and Ubs (Ψ) is bounded from below and has
positive jumps. Similarly
EP
k?,g
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
∣∣∣Û?I−i−1(Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs )− Û?I−i(Ubs−(Ψ))∣∣∣ds∣∣∣∣Gt]
≤ EPk
?,g
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
∣∣∣Û?I−i−1(Ubs−(Ψ)− h1,bs )∣∣∣ds∣∣∣∣Gt]+ EPk?,g [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
∣∣∣Û?I−i(Ubs−(Ψ))∣∣∣ds∣∣∣∣Gt]
≤ EPk
?,g
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
ρg
ρb
Ubs (Ψ)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ EPk?,g [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
ρg
ρb
Ubs (Ψ)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] ≤ 2EPk?,g [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
ρg
ρb
ubr(r+λ)sds
∣∣∣∣Gt] <∞.
The stochastic integrals appearing above are martingales, and taking conditional expectation in (D.1) we get EP
k?,g
[Gτ∧v|Gt] ≤
Û?I−Nt(ub) and from Fatou’s Lemma we obtain
Û?I−Nt(ub) ≥ lim
v→∞
EP
k?,g [
Gτ∧v
∣∣Gt] ≥ EPk?,g [ lim
v→∞
Gτ∧v
∣∣∣∣Gt] = Ugt (Ψ),
where we used that, Pk
?,g−a.s.
lim
v→∞
Gτ∧v = lim
v→∞
∫ τ∧v
t
e−r(s−t)
(
ρgdDs + k
?,g
s (Ψ)Bds
)
+ 1{v<τ}e
−r(v−t)Û?I−Nv (Ubv(Ψ)) =
∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
ρgdDs + k
?,g
s (Ψ)Bds
)
.
We end this section with the
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Notice that the inclusion Ct ⊆ Ct holds by definition and therefore we only need to prove the reverse
inclusion. We will make use of contracts with lump–sum payments to prove that every point in Ct belongs to the credible set Ct.
We start by defining the line with slope ρg/ρb which passes through the point (ub, ug) =
(B(I−Nt)
r+λSHt
, B(I−Nt)
r+λSHt
)
Mt(u
b) :=
ρg
ρb
ub +
Bj
r + λSHt
(
1− ρg
ρb
)
,
and the sets
C1t :=
{
(ub, ug) ∈ Vt × Vt : Mt(ub) ≤ ug ≤ Ut(ub)
}
, C2t :=
{
(ub, ug) ∈ Vt × Vt : Lt(ub) ≤ ug ≤Mt(ub)
}
.
From Section B.4 in the Appendix, we know that C1t ⊆ Cj . Indeed, every point from the upper boundary Ut belongs to the credible
set, and if we perturb a contract Ψ = (θ,D) only by adding a lump–sum payment ε at time t, that is dDΨ
′
s = 1{s=t}ε + dD
Ψ
s ,
then the values of the banks under Ψ′ are Ugt (Ψ
′) = ug + ερg and Ubt (Ψ′) = ub + ερb, so (Ubt (Ψ′), U
g
t (Ψ
′)) = (ub, ug) + ε(ρb, ρg).
We use this idea to prove also that C2t ⊆ Cj . From Proposition 4.2, we know that the graph of Lt is contained in Ct. Therefore
any point of the following form belongs to Ct
(ûb, ûg) = (ub, ug) + `(ρb, ρg), ` ≥ 0, ug = Lt(ub). (D.2)
By the geometry of the lower boundary Lt, the set of points of the form (D.2) is exactly C2t .
E Principal’s value function on the boundary of the credible set
E.1 The optimal full–monitoring contract in pure moral hazard
The full-monitoring problem studied in [51], considers that the only acceptable behaviour for the bank, from the social point of
view, is that she never shirks away from her monitoring responsibilities. In other words, only contracts with a recommendation
of k = 0 are allowed. In this section there is no adverse selection, so there is only one type of bank, and the main result stands
for both i = b, g, a good bank or a bad bank. The value function of the investor in this sub-problem is given by
V pm,0t (R0) := ess sup
(Di,θi)∈A0,i(t,R0)
EP
0
[∫ τ
t∧τ
(I −Ns)µds− dDis
∣∣∣∣Gt] ,
where the set of admissible contracts A0,i(t, R0) is defined for R0 ≥ bt, by
A0,i(t, R0) :=
{
(θi, Di) ∈ Θ×D, s.t. (θi, Di) enforces k = 0 and U it (θi, Di) ≥ R0
}
.
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Define for x > 0 the functions
φ(x) :=
(
1 + x
1 + 2x
) 1
x
−1
, ψ(x) :=
φ(x)− x
(1− x)φ(x) .
Let us then define some family of concave functions, unique solutions to the following system of ODEs
(
ru+ λ̂0j b̂j
)
(vij)
′(u) + jµ− λ̂0j
(
vij(u)− u− b̂j
b̂j−1
vij−1(̂bj−1)
)
= 0, u ∈
(
b̂j , b̂j + b̂j−1
]
,(
ru+ λ̂0j b̂j
)
(vij)
′(u) + jµ− λ̂0j
(
vij(u)− vij−1(u− b̂j)
)
= 0, u ∈
(
b̂j + b̂j−1, γ
i
j
]
,
ρi(v
i
j)
′(u) + 1 = 0, u > γij ,
(E.1)
with initial values γi1 := b̂1 and
vi1(u) := v
i
1 − 1
ρi
(u− b̂1), u ≥ b̂1, vi1 := µ
λ̂01
− b̂1(r + λ̂
0
1)
ρiλ̂01
,
and where for j ≥ 2, γij is defined recursively by
r/λ̂0j − 1 ∈ ∂vij−1(γij − b̂j), (E.2)
where ∂vij−1 is the super–differential of the concave function vij−1. The main result of [51] is
Theorem E.1. Assume that the
(
λ̂0j
)
1≤j≤I satisfy the following recursive conditions for j ≥ 2
r
λ̂0j
− 1 ≤ v
i
j−1
(
b̂j−1
)
b̂j−1
and
(
(vij−1)
′
(
b̂j−1
))+ b̂j−1
vij−1
(
b̂j−1
) ≤ ψ( r
λ̂0j
)
.
Then, under Assumption 2.1, the system (E.1) is well–posed and we have
V pm,0t (R0) = sup
ut≥R0
viI−Nt (ut) ,
where (us)s≥t is defined as the unique solution to the SDE on [t, τ)
dus =
(
rus + λ
0
I−Ns b̂I−Ns
)
ds− ρidD?,is
−
(
1{us∈[b̂I−Ns ,b̂I−Ns−1+b̂I−Ns )}(us − b̂I−Ns−1) + b̂I−Ns1{us∈[b̂I−Ns+b̂I−Ns−1,γiI−Ns )}
)
dNs
−
(
1{us∈[b̂I−Ns ,b̂I−Ns−1+b̂I−Ns )}b̂I−Ns−1 + (us − b̂I−Ns)1{us∈[b̂I−Ns+b̂I−Ns−1,γiI−Ns )}
)
dHs,
with initial value ut at t, and where we defined for s ∈ [t, τ) and j = 1, . . . , I
D?,is := 1{s=t}
(ut − γiI−Nt)+
ρi
+
∫ s
t
δI−Nri (ur)dr, θ
?
s := θ
I−Ns
i (us),
δji (u) := 1{u=γij}
λ̂0j b̂j + rγ
i
j
ρi
, θji (u) := 1{u∈[b̂j ,b̂j−1+b̂j)}
u− b̂j
b̂j−1
+ 1{u∈[b̂j+b̂j−1,γij)}
.
E.2 Proofs of the main results
We start this section with the
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Consider any time t ≥ 0 and take any ub,c ≥ C(I −Nt), as well as some Ψg ∈ Âg(t, L̂I−Nt(ub,c), ub,c).
From Lemma C.2, we know that the components of Ψg must satisfy θg ≡ 1 and that both banks shirk under Ψg. The payments
determine the utility of the banks and the following holds by definition
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)dDgs
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ub,c − C(I −Nt)ρb .
Besides, the utility of the investor under the contract Ψg is
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τI
t
(µ(I −Ns)ds− dDgs )
∣∣∣∣Gt] = I−1∑
i=Nt
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
− EPk
SH
[ ∫ τI
t
dDgs
∣∣∣∣Gt].
Now, observe that
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τI
t
dDgs
∣∣∣∣Gt] ≥ EPkSH [ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)dDgs
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ub,c − C(I −Nt)ρb ,
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and the equality holds if and only if Dg has a jump at time t of size u
b,c−C(I−Nt)
ρb
and dDgs = 0 for every s > t. That means that
it is optimal for the investor to use a contract with an initial lump–sum payment and to pay nothing afterwards. Consequently,
the value function of the investor on the lower boundary is given by
V L,gt (u
b,c) =
I−1∑
i=Nt
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
−
(
ub,c − C(I −Nt)
ρb
)
.
We continue this section with the
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Consider any time t ≥ 0. Take any ub,c ∈ [c(I − Nt, 1), C(I − Nt)), and Ψg ∈ Âg(t, ub,c, ub,c). From
Lemma C.1, we know that the components of Ψg must satisfy dDgs = 0 for all s ≥ t and that both banks will shirk under this
contract. Then, θg determines the continuation utilities of the banks in the following way
ub,c = EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt],
so in this case, the problem (5.2) reduces to
(P ) sup
θ∈Θ
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
µ(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt], s.t EPkSH [ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = ub,c.
Next, we rewrite the objective function in a more convenient way
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
µ(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
= µ(I −Nt)EP
kSH [
τNt+1 − t∣∣Gt]+ I−1∑
i=Nt+1
µ(I − i)EPk
SH [
1{τ>τi}(τ
i+1 − τ i)∣∣Gt]
=
µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
µ(I − i)EPk
SH
[
EP
kSH [
1{τ>τi}
∣∣Gτi]EPkSH [τ i+1 − τ i∣∣Gτi]∣∣∣∣Gt] = µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH
[θτi |Gt].
We do the same with the constraint
EP
kSH
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)B(I −Ns)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt] = EPkSH [ ∫ τNt+1
t
B(I −Nt)e−r(s−t)ds+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
1{τ>τi}
∫ τi+1
τi
e−r(s−t)B(I − i)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
=
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r
EP
kSH
[
EP
kSH
[
1{τ>τi}
(
e−r(τ
i−t) − e−r(τi+1−t))∣∣∣Gτi]∣∣∣∣Gt]
=
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH [
θτie
−r(τi−t)∣∣Gt].
So we obtain the following expression for our problem
(P )

sup
θ∈Θ
µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH
[θτi |Gt],
s.t
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH [
θτie
−r(τi−t)∣∣Gt] = ub,c.
We do not know how to solve (P ) directly, so we will define its dual problem, characterise its solution and show that the duality
gap is zero. In order to do that, we define the Lagrangian function L : Θ× R× Ω −→ R as follows
L(θ, ν, ω) :=− µ(I −Nt(ω))
λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
−
I−1∑
i=Nt(ω)+1
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH
[θτi |Gt](ω)
+ ν
(
B(I −Nt(ω))
r + λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
+
I−1∑
i=Nt(ω)+1
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH [
θτie
−r(τi−t)∣∣Gt](ω)− ub,c),
and also define the dual function and the dual problem respectively as
g(ν, ω) := inf
θ∈Θ
L(θ, ν, ω), (D) sup
ν∈R
g(ν, ω)
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Then, we have the weak duality inequality (where val denotes the value of the optimisation problem)
−val(P ) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ν∈R
L(θ, ν, ω) ≥ sup
ν∈R
inf
θ∈Θ
L(θ, ν, ω) = val(D).
We rewrite the dual function as follows
g(ν, ω) = −µ(I −Nt(ω))
λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
+ ν
(
B(I −Nt(ω))
r + λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
− ub,c
)
+ inf
θ∈Θ
I−1∑
i=Nt(ω)+1
∫
Ω
θτi(ω˜)
(
ν
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−r(τ
i(ω˜)−t) − µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
)
dPSHt,ω(ω˜),
where PSHt,ω is a regular conditional probability distribution for the conditional expectation with respect to the raw (that is to say
not completed) version of Gt. We have easily that it is optimal to set the optimal control θν to be θντi(ω˜) := 1ω˜∈Aiν (ω˜), where
the set Aiν is defined by
Aiν :=

Ω, if ν <
µ
B
r + λ̂SHI−i
λ̂SHI−i
,{
ω˜ : τ i(ω˜)− t > 1
r
ln
(
νBλ̂SHI−i
µ(r + λ̂SHI−i)
)}
, if ν ≥ µ
B
r + λ̂SHI−i
λ̂SHI−i
.
Therefore, for any ν ∈ R the dual function has the following form, using that the conditional law of τ i − t given Gt is the same
as the law of τ i
g(ν, ω) = −µ(I −Nt(ω))
λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
+ ν
(
B(I −Nt(ω))
r + λ̂SHI−Nt(ω)
− ub,c
)
+
I−1∑
i=Nt(ω)+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
(
νB(I − i)e−rx
r + λ̂SHI−i
− µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
)
fτi(x)dx. (E.3)
It is not difficult to see that g is a continuous and differentiable function. As we want to maximise g in the dual problem, we
compute its derivative with respect to ν and we get
g′(ν, ω) =
B(I −Nt(ω))
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
− ub,c +
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−rxfτi(x)dx.
Since ν 7−→ si(ν) is non–decreasing for any i = 1, . . . , I, g′ is non–increasing in ν. Furthermore, since ub,c ≥ c(I−Nt, 1), we have
the limit at +∞ of g′ is non–positive, and that its value for small ν is positive because ub,c < C(I −Nt) and
B(I −Nt(ω))
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
+
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
0
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−rxfτi(x)dx = C(I −Nt).
Therefore, there is a unique value of ν that makes g′ equal to 0. Now, we compute for any ν the value of the constraint from the
primal problem for the control θν
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH [
θντie
−r(τi−t)∣∣Gt] = I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−rxfτi(x)dx,
so θν is feasible in problem (P ) if and only if g′(ν, ω) = 0. Next, we compute for θν the value of the objective function in the
primal (minimisation) problem
−µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
−
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
EP
kSH
t
[
θντi
]
= −µ(I −Nt)
λ̂SHI−Nt
−
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
µ(I − i)
λ̂SHI−i
fτi(x)dx.
If this quantity is equal to g(ν, ·), the duality gap is zero. From (E.3) we see that this happens if and only if
ν
(
B(I −Nt)
r + λ̂SHI−Nt
− ub,c +
I−1∑
i=Nt+1
∫ ∞
si(ν)
B(I − i)
r + λ̂SHI−i
e−rxfτi(x)dx
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ νg′(ν, ·) = 0.
We conclude that if ν ∈ R is such that g′(ν) = 0 then the control θν is optimal in the primal problem.
We continue with the
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Define the process `s = ÛI−Ns(U
b,c
s (Ψg))−Ugs (Ψg) and note that `s ≥ 0 for every s ≥ 0. We will prove
that `t = 0 implies `v = 0 for every v ≥ t. Assume thus that `t = 0. Following the same idea as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we
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have for v ≥ t
`v =
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
−
(
rUgs (Ψg)−Bk?,gs (Ψg) + [h1,gs + (1− θgs )h2,gs ]λk
?,g(Ψg)
s
)
ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
Û′I−i(U
b,c
s (Ψg))
(
rUb,cs (Ψg)−Bk?,b,cs (Ψg) + λk
?,b,c(Ψg)
I−i (h
1,b,c
s + (1− θgs )h2,b,cs )
)
ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
h1,gs + ÛI−i−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )− ÛI−i(Ub,cs− (Ψg))
)
dNs
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
h2,gs − ÛI−i−1(Ub,cs− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )
)
dHs +
(
ρg − ρbÛ′I−i(Ub,cs (Ψg))
)
dDgs .
Since the functions Ûi solve the system of HJB equations (4.9), and
(
ρg − ρbÛ′i(Ub,cs (Ψg))
)
dDgs ≤ 0 for every s, we have
`v ≤
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
rÛI−i(U
b,c
s (Ψg))− rUgs (Ψg)− [h1,gs + (1− θgs )h2,gs ]λk
?,g(Ψg)
s
)
ds
−
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
λ
k?,g(Ψg)
s
(
θsÛI−i−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )− ÛI−i(Ub,cs (Ψg))
)
ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
h1,gs + ÛI−i−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )− ÛI−i(Ub,cs− (Ψg))
)
dNs +
(
h2,gs − ÛI−i−1(Ub,cs− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )
)
dHs
=
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
r + λk
?,g
s
)(
ÛI−i(U
b,c
s (Ψg))− Ugs (Ψg)
)
+
(
h2,gs − ÛI−i−1(Ub,cs (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )
)
θgsλ
k?,g
s ds
+
I−1∑
i=Nt
∫ τi+1∧v
τi∧v
(
h1,gs + ÛI−i−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )− ÛI−i(Ub,cs− (Ψg))
)
dNs +
(
h2,gs − ÛI−i−1(Ub,cs− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs )
)
dHs.
Recall from Remark 4.4 that on the upper boundary, we have
h1,gs = ÛI−Ns− (U
b,c
s− (Ψg))− ÛI−Ns−−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs (Ψg)), h2,gs = ÛI−Ns−−1(U
b,c
s− (Ψg)− h1,b,cs (Ψg)),
so that for i = Nt the drift of the right–hand side is 0 in [τ i, τ i+1) and the jump at time τ i+1 is also 0. It is easy to see that the
same happens for every i ∈ {Nt, . . . , I} and therefore `v ≤ 0 for every v ≥ 0 which means `v = 0 for every v ≥ t.
We go on with the
Proof of Proposition 5.4. (i) We have from the proof of Proposition 5.3 that the processes (θg, h1,b,c, h2,b,c) are necessarily
maximisers of the system of HJB equations (4.9). We can go back to the proof of Proposition 4.3, which is based on Corollary
D.1, to observe that for ub,c < b̂j the optimal θ ∈ Cj is uniquely given by θ = 0.
(ii) Observe that for every (t, ub,c, ug) ∈ [0, τ ]× V̂I−Nt × V̂I−Nt and Ψg ∈ Âg(t, ug, ub,c) we have
Ub,ct (Ψg) ≥ EP
k?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(ρbdD
g
s +Bk
?,g
s (Ψg)ds)
∣∣∣∣Gt]
=
ρb
ρg
Ugt (Ψg) + E
Pk
?,g(Ψg)
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)Bk?,gs (Ψg)ds
∣∣∣∣Gt](1− ρbρg
)
≥ ρb
ρg
Ugt (Ψg).
Then Ub,cs0 (Ψg) =
ρg
ρb
Ugs0(Ψg) implies that k
?,g
s (Ψg) = k
?,b,c
s (Ψg) = 0, for every s ∈ [s0, τ), and in consequently
Ub,cs (Ψg) =
ρg
ρb
Ugs (Ψg) ≥ bs, for every s ∈ [s0, τ).
We continue with the
Proof of Proposition 5.5. We divide the proof in 2 steps.
• Step 1: We start with the region ub,c > b̂I−Nt . Let Ψg = (Dg, θg, h1,b,c, h2,b,c) ∈ Ag(t, ub,c) be such that Ub,ct (Ψg) =
ub,c ≥ b̂I−Nt , Ugt (Ψg) = ÛI−Nt(ub,c). From Proposition 5.4 we know that
Ub,cs (Ψg) ≥ b̂I−Ns , k?,b,c(Ψg) = 0, s ∈ [t, τ).
45
Therefore, Problem (5.3) is equivalent to
V U,gt (u
b,c) = sup
Ψg∈Ag(t,ub,c)
EP
[ ∫ τ
t
µ(I −Ns)ds−
∫ τ
t
dDgs
]
, s.t

Ub,cs (Ψg) ≥ b̂I−Ns , s ∈ [t, τ),
EP
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)dDgs
]
=
ub,c
ρb
.
This is exactly the problem considered in Pagès and Possamaï [51] (see Theorem 3.15). We conclude that V U,gt (u
b,c) = vbI−Nt(u
b,c).
• Step 2: For the rest of the upper boundary, observe that the system of HJB equations associated to (5.3) is is given by
V̂0 ≡ 0, and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ I
min
{
− sup
(θ,h1,h2)∈CU,j
{
V̂ ′j(ub,c)
(
rub,c −Bkb,c + (h1 + (1− θ)h2)λ̂kb,cj
)
+µj + λ̂k
g
j θV̂j−1(ub,c − h1)− λ̂k
g
j V̂j(ub,c)
}
, V̂ ′j(ub,c) + 1
ρb
}
= 0, (E.4)
for every ub,c ≥ Bj
r+λ̂SHj
, with the boundary condition V̂j(Bj/(r + λ̂SHj )) = µj/λ̂SHj , and where
kb,c := j1{h1+(1−θ)h2<b̂j}, k
g := j1{Û?j (ub,c)−θÛ?j−1(ub,c−h1)<b̂j}
,
and the set of constraints CU,j determined by Proposition 5.4 is defined by
CU,j :=
{
(θ, h1, h2) ∈ [0, 1]× R2+ : h1 + h2 = ub,c, h2 ≥ B(j − 1)
r + λ̂SHj−1
, θ1{ub,c<b̂j} = (k
b,c + kg)1{ub,c≥b̂j} = 0
}
.
Then, for any ub,c < b̂j , the diffusion equation in (E.4) reduces to the ODE
0 = V̂ ′j(ub,c)
((
r + λ̂SHj
)
ub,c −Bj)− V̂j(ub,c)λ̂kgj + µj, (E.5)
with the boundary condition V̂j
(
Bj
r+λ̂SHj
)
= µj
λ̂SHj
. If ub,c < x?j , we get that
V̂j(ub,c) = µj
λ̂SHj
+ C1
((
r + λ̂SHj
λ̂SHj
)
ub,c − Bj
λ̂SHj
) λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
,
for some C1 ∈ R. If ub,c ∈
[
x?j , b̂j
)
, equation (E.5) is solved by
V̂j(ub,c) = µj
λ̂0j
+ C2
((
r + λ̂SHj
λ̂0j
)
ub,c − Bj
λ̂0j
) λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j
,
for some C2 ∈ R. The values of C1 and C2 for which the solution of equation (E.5) is continuous are
C1 =
µj
λ̂0j
− µj
λ̂SHj
+
(
ρb
ρg
) λ̂0j
r+λ̂0
j
(
vbj (̂bj)− µjλ̂0j
)
(
ρb
ρg
) λ̂SHj
r+λ̂0
j
( b̂j(r+λ̂0j )
λ̂SHj
) λ̂SHj
r+λ̂SH
j
, C2 =
(
vbj (̂bj)− µj
λ̂0j
)(
b̂j
r + λ̂0j
λ̂0j
)− λ̂0j
r+λ̂SH
j .
It follows from the properties of the map vbj , that the resulting function V̂j is a concave map with slope greater than −1/ρb and
therefore the family {V̂j}1≤j≤I is a solution of the system of HJB equations (E.4). It can be proved similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 (see also Theorem 3.15 in [51]), that the verification result holds for this family of functions. We therefore omit the
proof of this result.
We continue with the
Proof of Proposition 5.6. By definition we have the set equality Âg(t, L̂I−Nt(ub), ub) = Âb(t, L̂I−Nt(ub), ub). From Lemmas C.1
and C.2 we know that for every Ψb ∈ Âb(t, L̂I−Nt(ub), ub), both agents always shirk under Ψb, therefore the objective functions
in the definitions of V L,gt (u
b) and V L,bt (u
b) are also the same and equality holds.
We go on with the
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Proof of Proposition 5.7. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 5.5, with the only difference that since the principal
is hiring the bad agent, for ub < b̂j the ODE associated to the value function is
0 = V̂ ′j(ub)
((
r + λ̂SHj
)
ub −Bj)− V̂j(ub)λ̂SHj + µj,
with the boundary condition V̂j
(
Bj
r+λ̂SHj
)
= µj
λ̂SHj
.
We end this section with the
Proof of Proposition 5.9. The payments and the value of θ? in the case ub ≥ C(I −Nt) are a direct consequence of the proof of
Proposition 5.1. From the proof of Proposition 5.2 we have that if ub < C(I −Nt) then
θ?s = 1{
s−t> 1
r
ln
(
ν(ub)Bλ̂SH
I−Nt
µ(r+λ̂SH
I−Nt )
)},
where ν(ub) the solution of the associated dual problem. Since the quantity inside of the logarithm decreases with time, we have
that θ? is a process which starts at zero, jumps to one at some instant and keeps constant afterwards. This means that if θ?
jumps to one at some time s and the project is still running, necessarily the continuation utility of the bad agent is equal to
C(I −Ns) because the project will continue until the last default.
F Extensions of the model
F.1 Endogenous reservation utility
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Define the dynamic version of Ri0 by
Rit := sup
k∈K
EP
k
[ ∫ τI
t
e−r(s−t)(ρiµ(I −Ns) +Bks)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].
Observe that, thanks to our earlier results, we know that the previous expression depends on t only through the value of I −Nt.
Call then R̂iI−Nt = R
i
t, the value when there are I −Nt loans left. The explicit value of R̂i1 and the optimal action of the agent
of type ρi in (τ I−1, τ) were obtained in the study of short–term contracts with constant payments, in section B. Suppose now
that j > 1 and that the value of R̂ij−1 as well as the optimal action of the agent after default τ I−j are known.
If the agent decides to monitor all the loans in (τ I−j , τ I−j+1), his expected utility will be given by
ui(0) :=
ρiµj
r + λ̂0j
+
λ̂0j
r + λ0j
R̂ij−1.
The process h1,i(0) associated to this action is given by
h1,i(0) := ui(0)− R̂ij−1 = ρiµj
r + λ̂0j
− r
r + λ̂0j
R̂ij−1.
Therefore, it is incentive compatible to monitor all the loans in (τ I−1, τ) if and only if
h1,i(0) ≥ bj ⇐⇒ ρiµj − rR̂ij−1 ≥ bj(r + λ̂0j ).
Similarly, if the agent chooses to shirk in (τ I−j , τ I−j+1), his expected utility will be equal to
ui(j) :=
ρiµj +Bj
r + λ̂SHj
+
λ̂SHj
r + λ̂SHj
R̂ij−1.
The process h1,i(0) associated to this action is given by
h1,i(j) := ui(j)− R̂ij−1 = ρiµj +Bj
r + λ̂SHj
− r
r + λ̂SHj
R̂ij−1,
and it is incentive compatible to not monitor any loan in (τ I−1, τ) if and only if
h1,i(j) < bj ⇐⇒ ρiµj +Bj − rR̂ij−1 < bj(r + λ̂SHj ) ⇐⇒ ρiµj − rR̂ij−1 < bj(r + λ̂0j ).
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F.2 Unbounded relationship between utilities of the banks
A possible extension of our model could rely on a further differentiation between the work of the two banks, i.e. when both
banks work, the good one would be more efficient in the sense that the associated default intensity is strictly smaller than that
of the bad bank. We can do this by introducing an extra type variable with values mg and mb, with mg < mb and modelling the
hazard rate of a non-defaulted loan j at time t, when it is monitored by a bank of type i as αj,it = αI−Nt(1 + e
j,i
t mi + (1− ej,it )ε).
Then, if the banks fails to monitor k loans, the default intensity will be
λk,it = αI−Nt((I −Nt)(1 +mi) + (ε−mi)kt).
We did not consider such a situation because it creates a degeneracy, in the sense that the credible set no longer has an upper
boundary. Indeed, consider for simplicity the case j = 1 and take any ub0 ≥ bj1, t? ≥ 0 and choose the corresponding payment
c(t?) := ub0
e(r+λ̂
0,b
1 )t
?
(r + λ̂0,b1 )
ρb
≥ b
b
1(r + λ̂
0,b
1 )
ρb
≥ b
g
1(r + λ̂
0,g
1 )
ρg
.
Then, under the contract with delay and constant payments given by dDs = c(t?)1{s>t?}ds the bad bank will always work and
her value function will be equal to ub0 (see section B.2). Notice that the optimal strategy for the good bank will be also to work
at every time. Then, her value function is equal to
ug0 := u
b
0
ρg(r + λ̂
0,b
1 )
ρb(r + λ̂
0,g
1 )
e(λ̂
0,b
1 −λ̂
0,g
1 )t
?
.
We see that by increasing t?, it is possible to make ug0 as big as we want and keep fixed the value of the bad bank. This means
that the credible set will have no upper boundary in the interval [bb1,∞). Moving to any j > 1 and considering short-term
contracts with delay, with θ = 0 and the analogous payments, we observe the same degeneracy and the credible set will have no
upper boundary in the interval [bbj ,∞).
One way out of this problem would be to consider different discount rates for the banks, rb and rg, and assume that the
default intensities are such that λ0,bt + rb ≤ λ0,gt + rg. However, this complicates things a lot because simple statements that we
expect to be true are very difficult to prove or need assumptions on the parameters of the problem. For example the inequality
Ugt (D, θ) ≥ Ubt (D, θ) is no longer clear at all. We therefore refrained from going into that direction, and leave it for potential
future research.
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